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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to attempt to understand the
nature of the crisis in the Blue Hill Avenue shopping area, the site of
two riots; so that we could assist decision-makers and actors to help the
people of this area. Thus, the objectives were to develop information
and policy recommendations, and to communicate to people what is needed
for the area.
The parties involved in the functions of the shopping area are:
white businessmen, local consumers, black businessmen operating on the
strip, black leaders pressing for black ownership, property owners, and
the City of Boston in terms of its tax yield and its reputation.
In May and June, 1968, 81 white business owners (81 firms) were
interviewed out of a total population of 112. Twenty-eight of these are
closed businesses. Twenty-seven are planning-to-close, and 26 not-
planning-to-close. Forty-eight of the 53 open owners want to sell their
businesses, but only 16 have taken active steps towards closure in any
form. Altogether, only 6 firms were sold, representing only 4 transfers
from whites to blacks.
It was important to know whether people closed because of
violence or because of business conditions. Both explanations had to
be rejected as too simplistic. Instead, two sets of factors are
associated with closure: Sensitizing factors and Decisive factors. The
Sensitizing set seems to induce people to consider closure (factors
possessed by the closed and the planning-to-close groups): worth of firm
below median (below $22,500); residence outside of the shopping area;
receipt of threats; either youthfulness or old age; ownership of other
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businesses; and ownership of the firm by one person, rather than several.
But the possession of two additional factors from the Decisive set seems
decisive in producing actual closures (tactors possessed by the closed
group only): severe damage (store burned or person beaten); downward
trend of business before the riots; possession of outside income (other
businesses, other jobs, working wives, etc.); and the use of own funds,
not family's funds, to start their own businesses. These items
indicate that the owners have to be both disturbed by events and also
capable of doing something about their reaction. The not-planning-to-
close seem not to be disturbed; the planning-to-close seem to be
disturbed, but not able to do anything about their reaction.
Characteristics shared by all firms are irrelevant to the
decisions. Surprisingly, these include insurance, bank loans, size of
business, and status as owner or renter.
Among the policy recommendations is that of providing assistance
to facilitate transfers: a non-profit broker service, fair appraisals,
insurance, protection, financing, counselling, and communication of
information about opportunities for help.
Justification for helping the people involved in this area is
provided by the large numbers involved among the parties; by the fact
that at least one policy (assistance with transfers) seems agreeable to
all parties; and by the justice of providing "recompense" to parties
who bear as individuals the brunt of a situation for which the entire
society is responsible.
This research project attempted to incorporate action into its
very process: the investigator provided interim reports to the sponsors,
who represented various parties, so as to receive feedback--an iterative
research process. Secondly, she acted as a broker to bring resources
for black and white businessmen into the area. These relationships and
actions continue beyond this report.
Thesis Advisor: Donald George Marquis
Title: Professor of Organizational Psychology and Management
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Chapter One
PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study is about the white businessmen in the Grove Hall area
of Roxbury, in Boston. Two riots took place in this area: one in June,
1967, and one in April, 1968, immediately following the assassination of
Rev. Martin Luther King, a nationally known and respected black leader
who had preached love and non-violence as the means to black equality
and satisfaction in the United States.
At the end of April, 1968, we of the Planning Department at ABCD
were wondering what, if anything, could be done to assist the people in
this area--blacks and whites both. Robert Coard, who was then the Head
of the Planning Department, and now the Executive Director-elect of the
Agency, requested that I do this study.
Our intention was to gather information on the nature of the
crisis in the business area for the purpose of assisting potential
decision-makers and actors, in both the public and the private sectors,
to help the people of this area.
This Chapter (1) provides a brief sketch of the background of
Grove Hall; (2) states the purpose for doing this study; (3) describes
the problem as it seemed before collecting and analyzing the data,
stating assumptions and questions in the form of hypotheses; (4) states
the policy questions; and (5) describes the organization of the rest of
this report.
(1) BACKGROUND
Description of Grove Hall. The area known as Grove Hall is a
commercial strip along Blue Hill Avenue, covering about 16 blocks. It
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starts at Dudley Street to the north where there is a police station and
a church, and extends down to Seaver Street to the south, where Franklin
Park begins. The intersection of Blue Hill and Warren and Washington
Streets is Grove Hall proper, but the entire area is referred to either
as Grove Hall or as Blue Hill Avenue or "the strip".
The entire strip has been very run-down in appearance for several
years. While the surrounding area had originally been a middle-class
Irish residential area, about forty years ago a wave of Jewish immigrants
had settled in; and for many dozens of years, this had been a mostly-
Jewish area. The stores matched the clientele. There were many kosher
meat markets, tailors, bakeries, confectionaries, clothing stores, music
teachers, and so forth. A large Temple had been constructed quite near
to the Catholic Church. There were practically no liquor stores nor
taverns as there are now.
Three major changes have affected the area since those days. On
a national level, merchandising had long ago started to change from the
small-scale approach found on Blue Hill Avenue to large scale operations.
Locally, the residential area went through another major population
upheaval. About a dozen years ago, blacks started moving in from the
South; and the Jewish people started moving out to the suburbs. The net
result was not only a change in the particular people who lived there,
but also a net population decrease.
The area is now a predominantly black residential area with
relatively low population and with many run-down and vacant houses, and
vacant lots.
Since the transition, and particularly within the past five
years, rumors that the Boston Redevelopment Authority would announce
plans to redevelop (raze) the area have been an additional factor
affecting the area. The threat of urban renewal and the fact that taxes
had never been adjusted downwards to reflect the lowered profitability of
the commercial property combined to decrease upkeep in the area so that
it became extremely shabby.
Up until recently, the white businessmen numbered a few hundred;
because, even though many had moved away to follow their old clientele,
many had stayed and adjusted their ways and their wares to the new
2.
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clientele, and at the same time, still received business from the
old-timers who came back to shop.
Since the riots, at least 38 white businessmen are known to
have left the area. Where there were about 40 vacancies two years
ago*, there are now 80 vacancies. This is a rise from about 11% two
years ago, to almost 30%. But it is obvious that the process began
long before the riots.
Every other store appears to be boarded up--even many of the
open stores are operating behind boarded windows. All the white
merchants leave their stores early in the day while it is still light.
Such is Grove Hall, which is just about the geographic center
of Boston's black residential community--a very poor symbol of the
conditions to which many hopefuls moved up from the South.
Recent History in the Black Movement. A few words about recent
developments in the black movement for equality and satisfaction are in
order, because they too are part of the context in which the problem
developed. The pertinent recent development can be summed up in a few
sentences: blacks had come to press for an economic stake in their
community--their leaders had been voicing their need to own businesses,
especially in their own communities, and had been looking for ways to
develop business ownership, without much success. With the goal of
business ownership set, but results not forthcoming, there was a good
deal of resentment on the part of at least some blacks toward the white
merchants in their midst.
(2) PURPOSE
The purpose in undertaking this research was to gather
information that would tell us what needed to be done in a clear enough
fashion that decision-makers and actors could use the information to
assist the people of the area--both black and white.
A three-step development was envisioned for the project. First,
it would be necessary to understand the reactions of the businessmen,
* A Table showing the changes in numbers and per cents is in Chapter Three,
page 18. Demolitions reduced the number of business quarters available,
thereby giving a triple increase in per cent vacant, while the numbers
vacant doubled.
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their reasons for reacting as they did, and their problems in
accomplishing whatever plans they might be making.
Then this information would be plugged into the basic framework
of public goals, as we understand them: namely, that it appeared to be a
juncture in time at which the interests of all the factions involved in
the crisis area would converge in business transfers. We would also be
checking on our assumptions as to the interests of the factions as we
went along; the factions being the white businessman, the blacks who
want to own businesses (or want other blacks to own businesses), and the
consumers in the area.
The third step would be to use the information and the goals
together as a basis for policy recommendations.
(3) HYPOTHESES
The assumptions, expectations, and questions were stated in the
form of hypotheses in order to facilitate more rigorous investigation.
The businessmen would be interviewed, and their answers used to prove
or to disprove the hypotheses.
The basic questions that we* had were: how bad is the situation?
What needs to be done? and what can be done?
It seemed that the transfer of businesses from whites to blacks
would be paramount in everyone's minds, and also in the public interest.
It was important, however, to check on whether people wanted this,
whether transfers were happening, and also to find out what were the
problems in transferring, and what could be done to facilitate transfers.
The possibility that the area might become a "ghost town," if no
help were provided, seemed real. This would be undesirable for the
businessmen and property-owners and for the City's tax base. It would
also be undesirable for the consumers in the area; because transportation
out of the area is difficult (little public transportation and low
* I have prefaced the expectations that follow with "we expect,"
because these assumptions were not mine alone, but were in many cases
held by colleagues, the public, etc.
4.
Problem Statement
automobile ownership); and many people there are old or tied down with
children, and nearly housebound.
A ghost town atmosphere would also be bad for the black
businessmen in the area. (For example, although people speculated that
the reduced competition would improve business for the owners who
remained, talks with black owners as well as white ones point to the
opposite effect: people are not coming into the area to buy as they
used to, and business is getting very thin.)
Clearly, it would be in the interest of a great many people to
do something; it would be a public need which would justify intervention
and assistance from the public sector, at the least, and perhaps also
from the private sector.
The hypotheses that follow are the spin-offs or subsets of the
basic questions and assumptions above. The hypotheses are numbered so
that the results can easily be found by looking them up by number in
Chapter Three,on results.
(1) that relatively few white businesses are left in the area
since the riots;
(2) that many important consumer services are no longer
available to the neighborhood people;
(3) that little transfer of ownership has taken place;
(4) that white owners who closed are in serious difficulty and
are desirous of help;
(5) that white owners who stayed are frightened;
(6) that these still-open business owners are taking measures
to protect themselves;
(7) that the open-business owners would desire help;
(8) that most of these open owners want to leave;
(9) that most of these owners are taking active steps to leave;
(10) that the owners' businesses had been sufficiently good
that they have the resources to leave if they desire to
leave--resources to retire on or to start elsewhere with;
(11) that insurance--lack of insurance--is a big problem to the
businessmen, both to those who remain and to those who
want to sell or buy in;
(12) that owners who want to sell are running into problems
with potential buyers: (a) that buyers do not have enough
money to buy with; and (b) that sellers want cash for their
businesses, rather than being willing to hold a mortgage;
5.
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(13) that most businessmen would be too bitter to consider
staying on to help a new owner in the event of a sale;
(14) that the white businessmen would be very bitter and angry
with blacks;
(15) (we did not consider the businessmen's reactions to the
police, but their reactions are recorded in the section on
results--with this number.)
(16) that many businesses are too complex for a new or
inexperienced person to take over and run successfully;
(17) that many businesses are too costly for blacks to take
over;
(18) that businesses are not being offered at a "fair" price
(although we hoped that they were being offered at a fair
price);
(19) that the following factors are conducive to staying (that
is, encourage the businessmen to remain in the area):
(a) ownership of the business quarters;
(b) youth;
(c) long association with the neighborhood; and
(d) high profits;
(20) that the following factors are conducive to closing:
(a) fear;
(b) family pressure to close;
(c) advanced age;
(d) violence suffered;
(e) independence of location;
(f) loss of assets; and
(g) availability of other options;
(21) that the factors leading to closure are such that the more
factors a firm had, the more likely it would be to close;
(22) that the businessmen who had been doing poorly before the
riots are showing less initiative in dealing with their
problems now, and that those who had had growing businesses
are acting with more initiative;
(23) that business has improved for some since the riots, due to
reduced competition; but that those businesses relying on
walk-in trade or customers from other (white) areas would
be doing less business than before;
(24) & (25) that the general profile of the white businessmen would
include the following characteristics:
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(a) single proprietorships, rather than 2 or more owners;
(b) dependence on this business as sole source of income;
(c) located here for many years;
(d) Jewish;
(e) small business employing four people or fewer;
(f) work long hours;
(g) married, living with spouse, has children;
(h) had help from family in starting his business;
(i) came from a family with a business background;
(j) major obstacles when starting out were underfinancing
& lack of experience;
(k) started making money at an early age (under 12);
(1) went into business to meet a challenge;
(m) had other options, but preferred business; and
(n) does not want his children to be businessmen, because
he had a hard time.
(26) that some of the data collected about the white businessmen
would be useful for later studies of black businessmen; for
comparing amounts of insurance, family business background
and experience; credit availability; skills, and so forth.
(4) POLICY QUESTIONS
(1) What would facilitate the transfer of white business to
blacks?
(2) What policies would assist the situation in the Grove Hall
area?
(3) What would justify public intervention into these "private"
affairs?
(5) ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter One, Problem Statement, states the background of the
Grove Hall area, the purpose for doing the study, the hypotheses, and
the policy questions that are to be answered.
Chapter Two, Method, covers the following topics: Design,
Controls, Subjects, Samples, Interviewers, Questionnaires, Procedures,
and Analysis.
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Chapter Three, Findings, states which hypotheses were supported
or disproved by the study, and lists and discusses two questions that
were not answered in full by the study.
Chapter Four, Factors and Non-factors in the Decision to Close,
is the heart of the report in that it examines in detail the factors that
seem to have led to the decisions made, and the relationships among the
factors. It includes discussion of the findings in Chapters Three and
Four through comparison of the three groups: the closed, the planning-to-
close, and the not-planning-to-close.
Chapter Five summarizes the report and answers the policy questions
posed in Chapter One. It includes a list of actions that resulted from
this investigation and some discussion of action-research, as applied to
this project.
The Appendix contains the questionnaires for the open and closed
businesses; Findings from a survey of professional business brokers;
a Comparative list of types of businesses among the people interviewed;
miscellaneous letters of introduction used by the interviewers; and a
section giving a brief explanation of the use of statistical tests, and
giving formulae for those tests used in this analysis.
8.
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METHOD
This Chapter explains the following subjects: (1) Design,
(2) Controls, (3) Subjects, (4) Samples, (5) Interviewers,
(6) Questionnaire, (7) Procedures, and (8) Analysis.
(1) DESIGN
Investigations of human reactions to major events cannot usually
obtain an experimental research design in which subjects are collected,
a major event occurs or is administered, and then the subjects react,
giving the experimenter the opportunity to determine whether the subjects
reacted according to his hypotheses.
The design of this research project was not experimental in the
sense described above, but instead, descriptive. The events (riots)
occurred to the subjects and the subjects reacted to the events before
the investigator came on the scene. Thus, the investigation worked
backwards from reactions to events, to the testing of possible reasons
for the reactions reported.
This is a limited approach, but it was the only one available.
(2) CONTROLS
Because of the reversed sequence of events in this type of
research design, no deliberate attempt was made to obtain a control
group unaffected by riots--from outside the riot area. Nonetheless, the
subjects often selected themselves into "control" groups. For example,
one hypothesis concerned the relationship between damage sustained and
closure: the closed firms turned out to be the ones with the serious
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damage. Another hypothesis concerned the relationship between an upward
business trend and non-closure: again, the open group contained almost
all of the upward trend firms.
This is serendipity, rather than design.
(3) SUBJECTS
The subjects were white business owners who were operating in
the Grove Hall area of Roxbury (the riot area of Boston) during the first
two weeks of May, 1968, or who had been operating businesses in that
area during the past two years.
Eighty-one subjects were interviewed. They classified themselves
into three groups of nearly equal size: the closed, the open-planning-to-
close, and the open-not-planning-to-close. Having questioned the open
group as to their plans, the ones who said they planned to close were
classified as such; the ones who did not plan to close or who were
undecided were classified as not-planning-to-close. (A figure showing
the numbers in each group is on the page following this one.)
(4) SAMPLES
The numbers of interviews conducted represent almost complete
coverage of the population, rather than just a small sample. The almost
complete coverage goes a long way towards making up for whatever
inadequacies there may have been in the procedures.
Of the 74 open white businesses in the area, 53 were interviewed.
Seven of the 74 were taverns and were purposely omitted in order to
avoid the possibility of creating any brawls; meaning that we
interviewed 53 out of the 67 apparently feasible possibilities.
Twenty-eight of the 38 closed white businesses were interviewed.
Ten people could not be traced. Eighteen of the 28 interviews were full
interviews, and 10 of the interviews were partial, conducted by phone
with people who refused to be interviewed at greater length or in person,
Twelve of the complete interviews were done in face-to-face sessions.
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THE 81 FIRMS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED FORM THREE GROUPS:
THE OPEN-NOT-PLANNING-TO-CLOSE, THE OPEN-PLANNING-TO-CLOSE,
AND THE CLOSED.
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(5) INTERVIEWERS
The interviewers were graduate students. They were mostly from
the Harvard Business School (provided by the Business Assistance
Program, a student-run helping program), and a few people from Sloan
and other graduate schools at MIT.
About thirty interviewers worked on the interviews. This was
possibly a defect as far as overall consistency goes; however, the
coverage achieved could not have been achieved in the short time in
which it was done without the help of these many people. Also, a few
interviewers and I did the bulk of the interviews, providing some
consistency.
For the first set of interviews ( the ones with the open
businesses) the interviewers initially went out in pairs and later
interviewed singly. Since it developed that they had not had enough
practice with the protocols, for the second set of interviews, the ones
with the closed businesses, I held formal practice sessions before
sending out the interviewers. Also, the interviewers used a buddy system
for these interviews.
The reason for the buddy system was that experience taught us
that the businessmen seemed more comfortable with the respect,
formality, and importance implied by a visit of two people.
(6) QUESTIONNAIRES
The questionnaires used in the interviews with the businessmen
contained questions designed to test hypotheses concerning the
businessmen's reactions to violence, their decisions, their reasons for
deciding, and their "freedom" to decide. The protocol further contained
a number of questions designed to measure the extent of the "crisis" and
to give background material about the businessmen's lives and manner of
managing their firms.
Emphasis was placed on eliciting information about riot and other
damage sustained and about business conditions and profits in order to
test whether decisions to leave or to stay in the area were correlated
with these factors.
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The questionnaires took from half an hour to an hour and a half
to administer. They were nearly identical for the open and the closed
business owners. (Both questionnaires are in the Appendix.)
(7) PROCEDURES
The interviewers opened with a handshake and showed their school
identification. Then they showed letters of introduction and explanation
(in Appendix) from George Bennett, the Head of ABCD, and from Sol Kolack,
the Head of the Anti-Defamation League. The subjects were assured that
their interviews would be kept confidential. Most of the owners of open
businesses were very anxious to communicate their views (a typical remark
was: "It's about time you people got here.") The owners of closed
businesses were less welcoming, on the whole. Still, most of the
businessmen talked at great length (a professor from Harvard, Shulamuth
Gross and I, acting as a team, did one interview that lasted six hours!).
The subjects were thanked at the end of the interview, and were
told that they could receive copies of the results if they asked to see
them. We had about 20 requests, which I intend to honor as soon as the
final report has been mimeographed.
The Open Businesses. These interviews took place during the
first two weeks of May, 1968. The interviewers arrived daily on Blue
Hill Avenue, and approached and interviewed owners as they found them.
They prepared maps of the blocks as they went; so that there was a
complete count of the open businesses.
The Closed Businesses. The interviews with the owners of the
closed businesses took place during the latter part of May and throughout
June, 1968. The method of locating closed businesses was to ask
neighboring open businesses for the names of owners of nearby vacant
stores; and also to ask each open-business owner who was interviewed to
give us the names of all businessmen that he knew had left. This
produced a good deal of overlap, but it was worth it. On the other
hand, the method probably had the defect of our missing some of the
closures that had been accompanied by transfer although the open-
business owners did produce some of these cases. In short, we cannot
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be sure how many closures actually took place--our number is definitely
a minimum number--and also we cannot tell how representative the sample
was. Obviously, it is skewed towards overrepresentation of the business
owners who could be located.
Once we had the names of some of the closed owners, we still ran
into difficulties locating them. We used the Boston area telephone
books and scores of phone calls with some success. In some cases, we
tried the former landlords, but this did not help. In one case, I was
able to locate an owner through the liquor licensing board. Despite all
efforts, ten owners could not be traced.
Having located some of the former owners, we telephoned them
for interview appointments at their homes or new businesses. The
telephone for appointment approach was much less successful than
walking into the stores had been. It might have been better either to
write the owners first, before phoning, or to conduct the interviews
immediately during that first telephone conversation. After we had had
a number of rejections, I went over the list that had refused to talk to
interviewers, and conducted five interviews by telephone (these
interviews lasted half an hour to 45 minutes). I did not recontact those
refusers whom the interviewers had indicated as feeling harassed by us;
because, after trying two of these, I decided that they had had enough
trouble without my annoying them further.
For the telephone interviews, I offered the subjects the
telephone number of the Anti-Defamation League so that they might check
up on me before talking. They did not bother to check up, but they
seemed reassured by the offer. Also, I answered questions about who I
am as much as seemed necessary to establish some comfort for the subject.
The second defect in this sample was that, since those who had
experienced the worst damage were the least likely to be willing to talk
with interviewers, the sample was biased towards overrepresentation of
those who had had less damage.
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(8) ANALYSIS
Tallying. Several questions were omitted from the tallies,
because they had been worded so loosely as to be unreliable indicators
of characteristics. Only those questions that were concise were tallied
and reported here, although most of the questions could have been
tighter if I had known when devising the questions what I have learned
since.
Secondly, very few of the tallies total 81 (the number of
interviews), because subjects did not answer all questions.
Statistical Techniques. In contrast to the use of many
interviewers, all analysis was done by me, using standard tests of
significance for contingency tables: the Chi-Square Test, the Chi-Square
Test with Yates Correction for too-small cells, and the Fisher Exact
Test for the very small total number sets or when a cell contained only
a one or a zero. (Formulae are in the Appendix.)
(9) GEOGRAPHICAL AREA COVERED
The study area was Grove Hall, which is a strip of about
sixteen blocks along Blue Hill Avenue, running from Dudley Street to
the north to Seaver Street to the south. Grove Hall proper is near the
southern end of the strip, and is the intersection of Blue Hill Avenu, Warren,
and Washington Street. The area from Quincy Street, which is at the
approximate half-way point along the strip, to Grove Hall proper has
about twenty civil rights and community service organizations; and is
sometimes called "Agency Row." It also has the highest proportion of
black store-owners.
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FINDINGS
This Chapter reports the findings of the study: (1) lists the
hypotheses of Chapter One, and states whether they are supported or
denied by the findings; and (2) discusses questions not fully answered
by the study.
This Chapter does not go into great detail on the findings.
Most of the detail will be found in Chapter Four which presents and
discusses the factors and non-factors in the decisions made by the
three groups of businessmen. Other detail will be found in the Appendix.
(1) FINDINGS
This section lists the hypotheses, states whether they were
confirmed or denied by the information collected, and gives supporting
evidence for their confirmation or denial.
1. BASED ON DRIVING THROUGH THE AREA AND SEEING MANY STORES BOARDED UP
AFTER THE RIOTS IN APRIL, 1968, WE EXPECTED TO FIND RELATIVELY FEW
WHITE BUSINESSES LEFT ON THE AVENUE.
There was a total of 87 fewer firms operating now than in 1966.
Seventy-four white businesses were still in operation. Thirty-eight
white firms were found that had closed in the past year, but more than
this number had left in the past two years.
Forty firms that had been there in 1966 now could not be
accounted for. This discrepancy is probably due partially to the
differences in the methods of surveying, and due partially to some
demolition of commercial buildings in the area.
Findings
A Table showing the changes in numbers and per cents is on the
following page.
2. THINKING THAT MANY FIRMS HAD CLOSED, AND ALSO HEARING THAT MANY
IMPORTANT STORES HAD BURNED OR CLOSED, WE EXPECTED TO FIND MANY
IMPORTANT SERVICES WOULD BE UNAVAILABLE TO THE CONSUMERS IN THE
AREA.
Partially true. There were still stores represented in each
category of business that had been present before--although there are
now fewer stores. A particular problem is in the current scarcity of
pharmacies--only two were still open in May, 1968, out of a former total
of six.(Lists of the open and closed businesses are in the Appendix.)
On the other hand, if the trend continues as it has in the past,
there will be serious difficulties. Two years ago there were about 11%
vacant stores; today, 30%.
A table is on the next page.
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CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF OPERATING FIRMS AND IN VACANCIES
*
OVER THE YEARS
PER CENT
YEAR VACANT
1968 29.0%
NUMBER
VACANT FIRMS IN OPERATION
80 TOTAL ................ 198
VACANCIES PLUS
OPERATING FIRMS
**278
Black-owned Firms..... 102
White-owned Firms..... 76
Civil Rights, Social
Service, & Other
Agencies............. 20
1966 11.4%
1955
37 TOTAL................. 285
5 %
1945 10 %
1935 4 %
* Source: Figures for 1968 were derived from a foot-survey in May of this
year. Figures for 1966 are from a foot-survey in July, 1966. Earlier
figures are estimates based on material in the Polk Directory for the
years named. Material for all years prior to 1968 are from R. Poor,
Blue Hill Avenue Shopping Facilities, Boston Redevelopment Authority,
May, 1967, Statistical Appendix.
** Query: Where are the 44 firms comprising the difference between the 1966
and the 1968 totals? It is suggested that the difference is due partly
to differences in the surveying techniques, and partly to some demolitions
of commercial buildings.
322
18.
Findings
3. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT VERY LITTLE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP FROM
WHITES TO BLACKS HAD TAKEN PIACE.
True. Only six cases of sales (one of which was in process) came
to light, although there may have been others. Certainly there were sales
over the years, because there are now 102 black-owned businesses in an
area that probably had none fifteen years ago. On the other hand, the
number that occurred recently is difficult to assess; we know only that
the current number of black-owned businesses appears to be very close to
the number estimated two years ago, and not greater.
Only 5 of the 38 known closed businesses represent transfers of
ownership. The other 33 were not sold. Two of these businesses were sold
before the riots, one to a black and one to a white. (The one sold to the
black failed; the one sold to a white was burned out.) Of the three
recent sales, two were sold to blacks (one is out of business), and one
was sold to a white (still operating).
There seem to be no prospective buyers on the scene. Only 3 of
the 53 open business owners reported a prospective buyer. One of the 3
had concluded negotiations for the sale and was closing.
4. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT WHITE OWNERS WHO CLOSED WOULD (a) BE IN
SERIOUS DIFFICULTY AND (b) BE DESIROUS OF HELP.
(a) Not Determined.
Only ten of the 38 firms (one fourth) survived as businesses;
these relocated to other areas. Three other firms have had survival of
a sort in that their owners consolidated into their previously existing
branch locations. Thus, thirteen sets of owners are still in business;
the other twenty-five sets are retired (4), employed in other people's
businesses (7), unemployed (4), or have dropped out of sight and cannot
be traced (10).
(b) The owners who had left were very proud, and in many cases
* In "Blue Hill Avenue Shopping Facilities..1966," R. Poor, Boston
Redevelopment Authority, 1967, the number of black-owned businesses
was estimated as about 50% of the total number of businesses--about
130.
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refused to answer whether they needed help or not. They said they were
getting along and were thankful that they were out of the area and still
alive.
The number who did ask for help was 6 out of 15. They asked for
the following types of assistance: help to find buyers for property and
equipment left behind, to find new locations, or to finance opening a new
business. The people who had given up business--those working or
retired--did not ask for assistance. No one stated that they should be
"compensated."
5. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT THE WHITE OWNERS WHO STAYED WOULD BE
FRIGHTENED.
True. Riots, damage and threats have created tension and even
panic. Forty-six of 52 said that they were afraid that their stores would
be harmed in some way--looted, vandalized, robbed, or burglarized.
Thirty-four feared very serious damage--burning, looting, and vandalism.
Fourteen feared personal harm as well (beatings).
6. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT THOSE WHO STAYED OPEN ARE TAKING MEASURES
TO PROTECT THEMSELVES: CLOSING EARLIER, REDUCING INVENTORY, CARRYING
GUNS, AND PUTTING MORE BARRIERS ON DOORS AND WINDOWS TO MAKE BREAKING
IN MORE DIFFICULT.
True. All who stayed have taken several protective measures.
Several owners carry revolvers on their person or have them near to hand.
Several have heavy sticks, broom handles, or axes. (This further
measures the fear of personal harm.)
7. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT THE WHITE OWNERS WHO STAYED WOULD DESIRE
HELP.
True. The number who asked for help was 20 out of 35. They
asked for the following types of help: more protection; they wanted
their plight explained to people; and they are concerned to see attitude
hanges brought about. The ones who planned to leave wanted specific
help locating buyers, new locations, and financing.
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8. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT MOST OF THE OWNERS WHO STAYED WOULD WANT
TO LEAVE.
True, as indicated by their stating that they would like to sell.
Forty-eight out of 53 businessmen said they would like to sell their
businesses. Even the 26 businessmen who said that they did not plan to
close did want to sell their businesses; 21 out of 26 of the not-planning-
to-close said they would like to sell.
Twenty-seven of the still-open business owners said that they were
planning-to-close; 26 said that they were not-planning-to-close.
It seemed obvious that the owners' statements of plans--whether
they planned-to-close or did not-plan-to-close--were not of themselves an
indication of their desire to close! This is because plans are necessarily
a function of the owner's estimation of the feasibility of his coming out
of a closure with enough money to survive on or to start over again with.
In most cases, the feasibility of possessing such resources upon closure
would depend on selling. But for many, perhaps almost all of the still-
open businesses, selling does not appear to be a realistic possibility.
Thus, in this as in other things, plans and desires are not synonymous.
In fact, the businessmen face a dilemma: many owners seem to feel
that it is difficult to stay--but difficult to leave, too. Obviously,
if it were easier to leave, that would get them out of the dilemma.
Also, if it seemed more dangerous to stay than it currently seems to the
businessmen, they would be willing to take the loss to save their skins;
and get out of the dilemma that way. But by and large, the businessmen
do not have the resources, nor do conditions seem so extreme to them.
9. WE EXPECTED TO FIND MOST OF THE BUSINESSMEN TAKING ACTIVE STEPS TO
LEAVE.
False. This was far from the case; instead, very few have taken
active steps. Only 16 of the 27 businessmen who said that they planned to
close were taking active steps to close: looking for buyers, making plans
to liquidate, looking for a new location, planning to move, etc.
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10. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT THE OWNERS' BUSINESSES WERE SUFFICIENTLY
GOOD THAT THEY HAD THE RESOURCES TO LEAVE IF THEY DESIRED TO
LEAVE- -RESOURCES TO RETIRE ON OR TO START OVER AGAIN WITH.
False! Most businesses were relatively small; most businessmen
appeared to be relatively provincial and unequipped to deal effectively
with the demands placed on them by the upheaval in their business district;
and few owners had outside resources of any kind.
The people who were best equipped to leave were the ones who left.
These people had had outside businesses and other outside resources, and
appeared to operate more closely to the concept of "economic man." They
had shown more independence of spirit in starting their businesses with
their own money, rather than with family money.
The owners of the larger businesses felt that there was less chance
for them to be able to sell their businesses (because of the necessarily
higher price involved); and had more to lose by just closing. In some
cases several partners or stockholders are involved, making the decision
to close more complex.
Age was an additional handicap for the middle-aged group (those
40-54 years old), because they feel that it is too late for them to start
over again elsewhere, but too soon for them to retire.
11. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT INSURANCE--LACK OF INSURANCE--WOULD BE A
MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE BUSINESSMEN, WHETHER THEY WANTED TO STAY OR
TO SELL.
True, it is a problem, but not the primary one. For instance,
there was no correlation between closure and lack of insurance!
Still, it was cited as a big problem. People often mentioned lack
of insurance or inadequate insurance as a big worry. They also sometimes
mentioned not putting in claims for minor damage for fear that policies
would be cancelled and there would be no insurance if something big
happened. Constant petty damage without recompense, either because the
businessmen have no insurance or because they are afraid to claim on minor
damage, makes the cost of doing business in the area high.
High premiums were cited as a problem. These discouraged some from
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attempting to get insurance; those who did get insurance again had a
higher cost of doing business.
It seemed that in many cases the brokers might be at fault in not
obtaining insurance for their clients. Perhaps the brokers are fearful
of their reputations or their access to insurance companies if they place
policies with firms that might sustain heavy damage and make large claims.
Lack of insurance was mentioned as a barrier to selling businesses,
because loans cannot be made without insurance.
Sixteen of the 53 open businesses had no insurance. Twenty-three
had some of their insurance cancelled. Thirty-two said that they could not
get more insurance than they presently have--either because the companies
would not give it, or because the premiums would be too high for them to
afford.
Most owners who had insurance had only fire insurance and no
insurance against burglary nor other sorts of damage.
12. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT PEOPLE WHO WANT TO SELL ARE RUNNING INTO
PROBLEMS WITH POTENTIAL BUYERS: (a) THAT BUYERS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH
MONEY TO BUY AND (b) THAT SELLERS WANT CASH FOR THEIR BUSINESSES,
RATHER THAN BEING WILLING TO HOLD A MORTGAGE.
(a) Instead of finding that buyers' lack of money was the main
problem, the nearly total absence of potential buyers was the main problem!
This may be because lack of money deters people from approaching owners;
but it may also be because blacks are not interested in buying and
operating businesses, or because they are not interested in buying these
businesses!
The several people who had been approached by potential buyers
did cite lack of money as the prime problem, although there was a problem
with attitudes, too.
Only 4 of the 53 open businesses reported a prospective buyer,
although several had talked with people whom they did not consider
prospects.
The following problems with offers to buy were cited:
--that offers are ridiculously low--below the cost of inventory
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-- that attempts at extortion are made
--that the buyer has no money and has no chance of coming up
with money.
People do not have much hope of selling. Those who have advertised
their desire to sell have met with almost no success. Also, the owners
do not see other people selling their businesses. All told, only 6 sales
are known to have taken place since the riots (a year ago), although it is
probable that other sales have occurred and have not been noted.
Even the Urban League, a community institution that has been working
in the area of economic development and business transfers for over a year,
is quoted in the Boston Sunday Herald (July, 28 , 1968, page 49) as stating
they have come up with only 12 potential buyers, and nothing was said about
actual buyers. These items measure the seriousness of the dearth of
potential buyers.
(b) Eleven of 38 businessmen said that they would be willing to
hold a mortgage on the business in order to be able to make a sale.
Willingness to hold a mortgage measures willingness to sell. More of the
owners who were planning to leave were willing than those not planning to
leave. Only 3 of the not-planning-to-close were willing.
On the other hand, the unwillingness also indicates need for cash
for starting over again.
13. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT MOST BUSINESSMEN WOULD BE TOO BITTER TO
CONSIDER STAYING ON TO HELP THE NEW OWNER IN THE EVENT OF A SALE.
False! Thirty-six out of 38 businessmen said they would stay on,
without pay, to help a new owner.
14. WE EXPECTED THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN TO BE VERY BITTER AND ANGRY
WITH BLACKS.
False, surprisingly enough! There was remarkably little
resentment and little expression of racial prejudice on the part of
these owners, despite damage and fears.
As a measure of this attitude, 19 of 27 owners of open businesses
said they would be willing to counsel a black businessmen, without pay--
24.
Findings
whether they sold their own business or not.
Most people said they felt that only a few "hooligans" were
involved in the riots, and that most people in the area were very nice.
(This runs counter to the reports that many rioters were not "hard core,"
but were young men with decent or semi-decent jobs; that they were local
people; etc.) Secondly, many stated that their customers have begged them
to stay on, and that many customers had come in to apologize "for the
riff-raff."
On the other hand, there were some cases of pronounced prejudice
and anger. A few people made statements such as the following:
"They're trying to get these places for nothing, but I'll burn
down my own business before I'll let somebody take it away from me for
nothing";
"These people don't bother me: they know I carry a revolver and
that I'll use it, too, if I have to";
"We'll stand and fight like the Israelis"; and
"If there's any more trouble, all of us will close for a week;
and then they'll see what they have here without us, and they'll beg us
to stay open; and there won't be any more trouble."
15. WE DID NOT CONSIDER THE BUSINESSMEN'S REACTIONS TO TEE POLICE,
BUT MANY TOLD US WITHOUT BEING ASKED.
Many told us, without being asked, that police protection was very
poor. The only kudos given to the police were from owners in Grove Hall
proper. N.E.G.R.O., a black organization doing security patrols, was
praised several times.
16. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT MANY BUSINESSES WOULD BE TOO COMPLEX FOR
AN INEXPERIENCED PERSON TO TAKE OVER AND RUN SUCCESSFULLY.
Not determined. Several owners felt quite strongly that their
firms were too complex to be taken over and run successfully by a novice.
They said that it had taken them years to learn while their stores had
grown; they also said that the amount of work and long hours that it took
are both prohibitively high.
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17. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT MANY BUSINESSES MIGHT BE TOO COSTLY FOR
BLACKS TO TAKE THEM OVER.
Possibly true; but this cannot be determined without information
about black buying power.
The median asking price was $22,500. (This was given usually as
the price for inventory alone.)
To get an indication whether this is too high for blacks to afford:
the median is close to the maximum that can be borrowed under Small Business
Administration Economic Opportunity Loans (maximum is $25,000 FOR PEOPLE
WITH EXPERIENCE; $15,000 for people without).
18. WE EXPECTED THAT BUSINESSES WERE NOT BEING OFFERED FOR SALE AT A
"FAIR" PRICE (ALTHOUGH WE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE).
Possibly true; but this cannot be determined without professional
appraisal.
The businessmen were asked to state whether they would be willing
to sell for a "fair" price (48 out of 53 said that they would); and were
asked to state what a "fair" price would be. Most described a "fair"
price as just the cost of inventory with nothing for fixtures nor for "good
will." Occasionally, the price of the land and building were included.
They said things like: "just give me dollar for dollar for my inventory,
and I'll throw in the fixtures, and leave a happy man!"
19. WE EXPECTED THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO STAYING:
(a) OWNING THE BUILDING, RATHER THAN RENTING; (b) YOUTH; (c) LONG
ASSOCIATION WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD; AND (d) HIGH PROFITS.
(a) Owning turned out to be irrelevant, as was renting (cited in
the Chapter on Factors and Non-factors);
(b) Youth was not conducive to staying; middle-age was (a chart is
available on the following page);
(c) Long association with the neighborhood was relevant only in
that people felt emotionally attached and sorry to have to leave; but local
residence was associated with staying; and
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(d) Profit was conducive to staying in that those businessmen who
said that the trend of business had been "steady" or "up" were mostly
among the open businesses; and many of the closed businesses had been
going "down." However, a word of caution is necessary here: we do not know
how much profit is involved or the magnitude of the sales trend; so we are
in no position to judge what standards the owners used nor how consistent
these standards are among the owners.
20. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO
CLOSING: (a) FEAR; (b) FAMILY PRESSURES; (c) ADVANCED AGE;
(d) VIOLENCE SUFFERED; (e) TYPE OF BUSINESS THAT IS RELATIVELY
INDEPENDENT OF LOCATION; (f) LOSS OF ASSETS WITH WHICH TO RESTART
OR REMAIN OPEN; AND (g) AVAILABILITY OF OTHER OPTIONS.
(a) Fear was conducive to closing;
(b) Family pressure was occasionally mentioned, but not often;
(c) Advanced age was conducive to closing, but so was youth;
(d) Violence suffered was conducive to closing;
There have been many incidents of damage and there is a lot of
fear.
Almost everyone has suffered damage, and suffered damage
repeatedly. Only 8 businesses (of the 53 open ones ) have had no trouble.
Forty-four had some damage. Thirty-two have been damaged during one or
both riots. Forty-one have been damaged both during a riot and at other
times. There have been 16 incidents of very serious damage (mostly during
the riots) - property damage of $5,000 and over and one case of a beating.
Nineteen people said that they received oral threats. Several people
report that their black managers and employees have been threatened or
"coerced to leave." Several report that their white employees are afraid
to come to work. They are finding it difficult to keep their employees.
Several employers drive their employees to and from work (both black and
white employees).
Thirteen of the closed firms suffered very serious damage: eight
firms were burned out, and five other firms suffered personal injury
(beatings) to the owners or an employee. None of the firms that closed
had completely escaped some form of damage. Each firm had had incidents
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of burglary, robbery, and/or vandalism; and usually these were often-
repeated incidents.
While damage was very important in some of the cases of closure,
for other cases there existed a nearly equivalent damage situation between
open and closed firms; this points out that some other factors must explain
these closures.
(e) Independence of location was a factor, but most of the businesses
are not independent of location;
(f) Loss of assets was not thoroughly investigated, because so many
of the closed business owners who suffered serious damage either could not
be located or would not talk when they were located;
(g) Availability of other options was definitely conducive to
closing: a much higher proportion of closed owners had other businesses or
other outside income than the owners who stayed.
21. WE EXPECTED THAT THE FACTORS CAUSING OR INFLUENCING CLOSURE WOULD BE
SUCH THAT THE MORE FACTORS A FIRM HAD, THE MORE LIKELY IT WOULD BE
TO CLOSE.
False. Instead, we found that one set of factors "sensitized" the
owners so that they considered closing; but another set of factors was
"decisive" in translating potential into actual closures. The Chapter on
Factors and Non-factors describes these factors in detail.
22. WE EXPECTED THAT THE BUSINESSMEN WHO HAD BEEN DOING POORLY BEFORE THE
RIOTS WOULD SHOW LESS INITIATIVE IN DEALING WITH THEIR PROBLEMS NOW,
AND THAT THOSE WHO HAD HAD GROWING BUSINESSES WOULD BE ACTING WITH
MORE INITIATIVE NOW.
Not determined--what is initiative?
Despite the desire to leave, very few of the owners have taken
active steps towards leaving; only 16 have taken some steps. Undoubtedly
a wait-and-see attitude is partially responsible for this inaction.
In the case of the 27 owners who say that they plan to close, it
appears that lack of education and lack of past independence of spirit are
further factors that inhibit the effectuation of plans to close.
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The group that closed had a higher proportion of owners who said
that business had been "down," but this does not deny the hypothesis,
because, as mentioned above, we have no way of telling how objective or
universal were their standards. Secondly, there was counter-information
for this same group: they were the people who owned the most outside
businesses and other forms of income.
23. WE EXPECTED TO FIND THAT BUSINESS WOULD HAVE IMPROVED FOR SOME SINCE
THE RIOTS, DUE TO REDUCED COMPETITION; BUT THAT THOSE BUSINESSES
RELYING ON WALK-IN TRADE OR CUSTOMERS FROM OUTSIDE AREAS WOULD BE
DOING LESS BUSINESS THAN BEFORE.
True. The riots have produced worse conditions for most of the
businessmen--including the black ones I have talked to. In addition,
many businessmen mentioned that their employees were giving them
difficulty: employees are afraid to stay in the area towards the end of
the day; some employees have to be driven to and from work for their
protection; some employees have quit (both black and white--a few
businessmen said that their black employees have been "coerced" to quit).
These items raise the cost of doing business.
24. WE EXPECTED THAT THE GENERAL PROFILE OF THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN WOULD
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS: (a) MOST BUSINESSES ARE SINGLE
PROPRIETORSHIPS OR FAMILY BUSINESSES; (b) MOST BUSINESSMEN OWN ONLY
THIS BUSINESS AND DEPEND ON IT FOR THEIR SOLE SOURCE OF INCOME;
(c) MOST WERE HERE FOR MANY YEARS; (d) MOST ARE JEWISH; (e) MOST
ARE SMALL BUSINESSES EMPLOYING FOUR PEOPLE OR FEWER; (f) MOST WORK
LONG HOURS TO KEEP THE BUSINESS GOING; (g) MOST ARE MARRIED, LIVING
WITH THEIR SPOUSE, AND HAVE CHILDREN (BUSINESSMEN ARE CONVENTIONAL
PEOPLE); (h) MOST HAD HELP FROM THEIR FAMILIES IN STARTING THEIR
BUSINESSES; (i) MOST HAD COME FROM A FAMILY WITH BUSINESS BACKGROUND;
AND (j) THEIR MAJOR OBSTACLES WHEN STARTING OUT WERE UNDERFINANCING
AND THEIR OWN INEXPERIENCE.
All true.
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25. WE EXPECTED THAT THE GENERAL PROFILE OF THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN WOULD
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS: (k) THEY STARTED MAKING MONEY
AT AN EARLY AGE (UNDER 12); (1) THEY WENT INTO BUSINESS TO MEET A
CHALLENGE; (m) THEY HAD OTHER OPTIONS, BUT PREFERRED BUSINESS; AND
(n) THEY DO NOT WANT THEIR CHILDREN TO BE IN BUSINESS, BECAUSE OF THE
HARD TIMES THEY HAD IN BUSINESS.
All false.
26. WE EXPECTED THAT SOME OF THE DATA COLLECTED ABOUT THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN
WOULD BE USEFUL FOR LATER STUDIES OF BLACK BUSINESSMEN: FOR COMPARING
AMOUNTS OF INSURANCE; CREDIT AVAILABILITY; FAMILY BUSINESS BACKGROUND;
AND SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE.
This remains to be seen. At this point in time it no longer seems
necessary to spend time documenting the existence of prejudice. Secondly,
talks with black businessmen in this area and in others show very similar
problems including incidence of vandalism and severe damage!
(2) QUESTIONS NOT FULLY ANSWERED BY THE STUDY
1. ARE THE BUSINESSES WORTH BUYING?
Without a market analysis and without professional appraisals for
the individual businesses, this is impossible to ascertain. We do know
that the businesses did well enough in the past to support the owners and
their families--but not in any grand style, as indicated by their current
lack of resources.
As to the present, the high cost of doing business--due to damage,
fears, etc.--must not be confused with the question of whether an ample
market exists in the area. There is no doubt that there are plenty of
people in the area and that other nearby shopping areas are not more
outstanding in variety and magnetism.
Whether the area can be profitable in the future may depend on
public intervention: the cost of doing business in this area is currently
very high due to damage, lack of insurance, lack of adequate protection,
the need for shorter store hours, etc. Yet people require services.
31.
Findings
2. WERE THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN UNFAIR IN THEIR BUSINESS PRACTISES TO
THEIR BLACK CUSTOMERS?
This cannot be determined without talking with the black customers
nor without thorough documentation of incidents. Probably there was
unfairness on the part of some of the businessmen--but not on the part of
all of them.
Secondly, in considering charges of too-high prices, allowance
must be made both for the higher costs of doing business in the area and
also for the higher operating costs of small businesses.
Thirdly, it has not been my experience to find black businessmen
on the strip charging lower prices than white businessmen. (This is not
surprising since they face the same costs and problems as the whites.)
3. WOULD THE WHITE BUSINESSMEN HAVE LEFT REGARDLESS OF THE RIOTS?
The businessmen say that they would not have left. Forty-eight of
62 businessmen said that they would not have even thought of leaving if it
had not been for the riots. Also, 54 of 61 said that business opportunity
in the area would have been good if the riots had not occurred.
It is difficult to guess what would have been the normal attrition
for the area had the riots not occurred. At any rate, the chart on the
following page shows the dates of closures, and indicates that there is a
relationship between the dates of closures and the dates of the riots.
As a general rule, business closures are normally low during the months
preceding Christmas and high in the winter months before Easter shopping,
when business picks up again somewhat.
Other reasons for thinking that the businesses might not have
closed are that at least two thirds of the owners were young and middle
aged (below 60 when an owner might begin to consider retiring); and,
while most of the firms surely are not so profitable here as in other
places, yet people have different demands for profit and income.
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DATE
Prior to
Jan, '67
Jan, '67
Feb, '67
Mar, '67
Apr, '67
May, '67
Jun, '67
Jul, '67
Aug, '67
Sep, '67
Oct, '67
Nov, '67
Dec, '67
Jan, '68
Feb, '68
Mar, '68
Apr, '68
TOTAL
DATES OF BUSINESS CLOSURES
NUMBER OF CLOSURES
1
0
1
1
1
0
4
2
1
0
0
0
2
1
2
1
7
24
---June riot
--- April riot
* This information was available for twenty-four of the
thirty-eight closures.
** Both the mode and the median number of business closures
per month is: 1.
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Chapter Four
FACTORS AND NON-FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO CLOSE
Introduction
What were the factors affecting the decision to close? This
Chapter presents these factors by setting out two areas: those character-
istics for which there were significant differences among the three groups
(closed, planning-to-close, and not-planning-to-close), and those charac-
teristics for which there were no significant differences, but, instead,
similarities.
The characteristics that differed significantly among the three
groups are the factors in the decisions. The characteristics that were
similar among the three groups are the non-factors.
The answer to the question was somewhat surprising. We had
expected to find a set of factors such that the more factors a business
had, the more likely the business would be to close. This is not the case.
Instead, we found two sets of factors (as opposed to any one set, or to
any one factor) that affected the decision to close. One set seems to
sensitize the owner to the thought of closing; but the other set seems
decisive for mobilizing the owner to the act of closure. The non-factors
were, of course, irrelevant to the decisions.
Factors and Non-factors in the Decisions
A. NON-FACTORS
Many of the characteristics studied turned out to be non-factors
in the decision to close or to stay open. That is, there were many
characteristics shared equally by each of the three groups: the closed,
the open planning-to-close, and the open not-planning-to-close.
Factors and Non-Factors in the Decisions
Some of these non-factors are personal characteristics of the
owners of the firms; such as, willingness to help black businessmen by
counselling, willingness to ask for help for themselves, ethnic
background, and so forth. That these personal, or personality,
characteristics are non-factors does not astonish us; because past
research has not often dwelt on such factors, nor pointed them out as
factors in other business decisions.
But some of the non-factors are characteristics of the firm
itself (as opposed to personal characteristics of the owner of the firm)
which we expected to be factors in the decision; because past research
and also current "common sense" indicate their importance. Many of these
turned out to be non-factors.
The economic characteristics of the firm that ran contrary to our
expectations by being non-factors in the decision are the following:
1. Size of business - as indicated by the number of employees:
12 of 67 firms had no employees and 24 had four or more employees; but
there were no significant differences among the decision groups;
2. Security as indicated by insurance - lack of insurance as
opposed to having some insurance, however inadequate: 19 of 70 had no
insurance, and 51 had some insurance, but there were no major differences
among the decision groups;
3. "Business-like" use of credit - as indicated by the use of
bank loans in the past: 16 of 58 had used a bank loan at one time or
another, and 42 had not; again, no significant differences among the
*
groups;
4. Relative Mobility - as indicated by rental of business
quarters as opposed to ownership: 50 of 76 firms-rent, and 26 own their
business quarters; no significant differences among the groups; and
5. Types of businesses.- the types of businesses that closed form
a list very similar to the ones still open; excepting, that most of the
drug stores have closed, and that the closures include none of the
* The 28% use of bank loans in the past is higher than the 20%
reported by Basil Zimmerman for the businesses in his Providence,
R.I., study of business relocations.
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wholesale, manufacture, nor gas stations businesses which are all still
open. (A comparative list is in the Appendix.)
In other words, the way the firm is managed (as measured by
number of employees used, acquisition of insurance, use of bank loans, and
ownership of business quarters rather than rental) is not a factor in the
decision to stay open or to close'
This interesting finding forces us to place more reliance upon
the other economic, personal, and event characteristics of the businesses
as factors affecting the decisions that were made.
One personal characteristic that we would have expected to have
some bearing, but which turned out to be a non-factor, was the owners'
families' background as business people. But this too may reflect the
management of the firm; and, if so, is consistent with the above finding.
The following is a complete list of the non-factors...
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ALL THREE GROUPS POSSESS THE NON-FACTORS
NON-FACTORS- -CHARACTERISTICS
WITH NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFEREN-
CES AMONG THE THREE GROUPS
(a) Management Characteristics
1. Size of business as indica-
ted by number of employees:
Firms with no employees:
Firms with four or more:
2. Firms with no insurance:
3. Firms that have used bank loans:
4. Firms that rent (vs. own):
(b) Personal Characteristics
5. Owner said that business
opportunity would have been
good in the area if the riots
had not occurred:
6. Owners willing to help black
businessmen by counselling
7. Owners asking help for
themselves:
8. Owners who are Jewish:
9. Owners who want their children
to be businessmen:
10. Owners whose families had been
in business:
11. Owner's age at the time he made
his first money is below the
median for the group (below
14 years old):
12. Types of businesses
(A comparative list is in
the Appendix):
D E C I S IO N G R O U P S
OPEN, NOT OPEN, BUT
PLANNING PLANNING
TO CLOSE TO CLOSE CLOSED TOTAL
3/26
12/26
9/25
6/20
15/26
19/22
9/15
9/18
19/26
9/15
17/23
8/16
5/24
7/24
7/25
6/23
18/26
22/24
9/11
11/17
19/26
6/14
16/19
6/15
4/17
5/17
3/20
4/15
17/24
12/67
24/67
19/70
16/58
50/76
13/15 54/61
8/16 26/42
6/15
23/27
26/50
61/79
6/14 21/43
17/19 50/61
9/15 23/46
38.
Factors and Non-Factors in the Decisions
This section presented the non-factors: the characteristics shared
by all three decision groups and, thus, irrelevant to the decisions made.
We were surprised to find that several economic characteristics of the
firm were non-factors: size of business as indicated by number of employees;
insurance (some vs. none); bank loans (use vs. non-use); and ownership vs.
rental of business quarters. These are characteristics that can be
considered indicators of style of management.
We will now turn to the factors in the decisions.
B. FACTORS
The following sections will present the several types of factors
that we found: Sensitizing factors, Decisive factors, the Exceptional factor,
and the Responsiveness characteristic. They will show that one set of
factors--the Sensitizing factors--seem required for consideration of
closure, or for potential to close; but another set of factors--the
Decisive factors--seem decisive for determining actual closure. It is not
a case of the more factors, the more likely to close; instead it is like
the selection from a Chinese menu: several from group A and two from group
B.
Whether a characteristic was considered a factor was determined by
the way in which it related the groups--which groups shared which
characteristics. The ways in which the groups were related turned out to
be complex. Although we began with the idea of finding simple differences
between two decision groups (open and closed firms), the data developed so
as to force us to recognize three distinct decision groups: the closed,
the open-planning-to-close, and the open-not-planning-to-close. Instead of
the simple either-or comparisons available in a set of two, the comparisons
were, of course, more numerous; because the three groups are related or not
related in a greater variety of ways.
Thus, given the importance and the complexity of the relationships
among the groups, we will stop a moment to clarify these relationships.
After this, we will go on to look at the factors themselves.
One relation among the groups was considered in the previous section:
in the section on Non-factors, all groups are related by a common
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characteristic (which was the reason for calling these characteristics
non-factors). This relation can be represented as follows:
N P C
1. all groups agree X X X 12 factors
The rest of the ways that the groups are related by characteristics
shared and not shared can be represented as follows:
closed & planning-to-close agree
closed & not-planning-to-close agree
none agree
both open groups agree
- X X
X- X
XX -
6 factors
1 factor
1 characteristic
4 factors.
A chart on the following page shows these relationships graphi-
cally in terms of the types of factors involved.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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THE GROUPS ARE RELATED TO EACHOTHER IN FOUR BASIC WAYS, AS FOLLOWS
D E C I S IO N G R 0 U P S
F A C T O R S E T S OPEN, NOT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE
XXXXXXXXX
1. Non-factors XXXXXXXXX
2. Sensitizing Factors
3. Decisive Factors
4. Exceptional Factor
OPEN, BUT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
X)OCOOXXX
X2XXXXX
xXOOXXXXXX
XXOOOOOXX
Xooooooox
XXXXXX2O(X
CLOSED
X200000XX
XXXXXOO(XX
XXX000C
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXCOCX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXOOXX
XXXXOO(
XXXXOO(
The Decisive factors are so-called, because they are present
only in the closed group. The Sensitizing factors are so-called, because
they are shared by the closed and the planning-to-close groups. It is
conjectured that the possession of these characteristics "sensitized"
these groups to consider leaving; and that the possession of the Decisive
factors was "decisive" in affecting the transition from thought to action.
The non-factors were present in all three groups, despite the difference in
the decisions; therefore, we conclude that they do not act upon the
decision. The exceptional factor will be explained more fully below; but
this factor seems to make the difference in individual cases (as opposed
to group cases) when the Decisive factors are missing for a few closed firms,
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or when some Decisive factors are present for a few open firms.
Having presented the general relationships, we will now turn to the
factors.
(1) Sensitizing Factors
The Sensitizing factors appear to sensitize the closed and the
planning-to-close groups to consider closing, although they are not
sufficient, without other additional factors, to produce closure.
The Sensitizing factors are the factors for which there is
agreement between the closed group and the planning-to-close group;
significant difference between these groups and the not-planning-to-close
group. The Sensitizing factors seem to produce the closed and the
planning-to-close groups.
These factors are the following:
1. Worth of business below median (below $22,500) - most of the
owners of closed and planning-to-close firms set the worth of their firms
at a price below the median for the three groups of businesses: 17 of the
25 closed and planning-to-close firms set their worth below the median,
in contrast to only 3 of the 15 not-planning-to-close firms;
2. Owner's residence outside of the business area (outside of
Roxbury, Dorchester, or Mattapan) - most of the owners of closed and
planning-to-close firms do not live locally: only 6 of the 46 owners of
closed and planning-to-close firms live locally, as compared to 10 of the
21 owners of not-planning-to-close firms;
3. Owner received threats - more of the owners of closed and
planning-to-close firms received threats (oral threats of some kind,
including attempted extortion): 22 of 45 owners of closed or planning-to-
close firms received threats, as compared with 5 of the 21 not-planning-
to-close;
4. Owner is either "young" (25-39 years old) or "old" (55 and up) -
most of the owners of closed and planning-to-close firms are either
"young" or "old": 27 of the 39 owners of closed and planning-to-close
firms were in these age groups (not "middle" age group), as compared with
10 of the 24 owners of not-planning-to-close firms;
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5. Some owners own other firms in addition to this one - more of
the owners of closed and planning-to-close firms own other businesses:
10 of 32 of the closed or planning-to-close owners own other firms, in
comparison with 2 of the 24 owners of not-planning-to-close firms; and
6. Firm has one owner, rather than two or more - most of the
closed and planning-to-close firms are one-owner businesses: 29 of the
closed and planning-to-close firms are one-owner businesses, as compared
with 10 of 26 not-planning-to-close firms.
The distributions and the levels of statistical significance are
presented in the table on the next page.
On the page following that table are presented the reasons why
the factors possessed by the closed and the planning-to-close are
conducive to closing.
All of the factors shared by the closed and the planning-to-close
business owners are factors conducive to leaving, and these are factors
not possessed by the not-planning-to-close group.
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THE CLOSED AND THE PLANNING TO CLOSE GROUPS POSSESS THE SENSITIZING FACTORS
D E C I S IO N G R O U P S
SENSITIZING FACTORS OPEN, NOT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE
OPEN,BUT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE CLOSED TOTAL
1. Worth of business is below
median for all businesses
(below $22,500):
2. Owner resides outside of
the immediate business
area (outside of Roxbury,
Dorchester, or Mattapan):
3. Owner received threats:
4. Owner is either "young"
(25-39 years old) or "old"
(55 and up), rather than
"middle" aged (40-54):
5. Owner owns other businesses:
6. Firm has one owner, rather
than two or more:
3/15
11/21
5/26
10/24
2/26
10/15
17/19
14/27
18/22
5/24
10/26 15/24
7/10 20/40
23/27 51/67
8/18 27/71
9/17 37/63
5/18 12/68
14/24 39/74
* Differs significantly from expected frequency by Chi-Square Test
with probability less than .01 (Yates Correction used on factor #1.).
** Differs significantly.. .with probability less than .025.
*** Differs significantly.. .with probability less than .05.
**** Differs significantly.. .by Fisher Exact Test with probability of .082.
**** Differs significantly.. .by Chi-Square Test with probability less than
.10.
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THE SENSITIZING FACTORS SHARED BY THE CLOSED AND THE PLANNING-TO-CLOSE GROUPS
ARE FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO CLOSING
SENSITIZING FACTORS
1. Worth of business below
median (below $22,500)--
2. Residence outside of the
business area--
3. Receipt of numerous threats--
4. Either young or old
(25-39 or 55 years and up)--
5. Ownership of other firms--
6. One-owner businesses--
THE SENSITIZING FACTORS POSSESSED BY
THE CLOSED AND THE PLANNING-TO-CLOSE
FIRMS ARE CONDUCIVE TO CLOSING,
BECAUSE.....
not much to lose.
lesser emotional or social ties with
the area (although this is not unusual
as business areas go).
heightens fear.
the younger are able to change more
easily; the older are of an age to
be thinking of retiring.
some independence of opportunity.
simpler decision process (although
this item may also reflect smaller
size of firm).
The not-planning-to-close group does not possess the Sensitizing
factors which are reasons for considering closing. Instead, the not-
planning-to-close group possesses the converse of the Sensitizing factors;
that is, this group possesses factors conducive to staying. These factors
are presented on the following page.
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THE CONVERSE OF THE SENSITIZING FACTORS ARE POSSESSED BY THE NOT-PLANNING-
TO-CLOSE GROUP, AND THESE ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO CLOSING, BUT TO STAYING
THE CONVERSE OF THE
SENSITIZING FACTORS
1. Worth of business above median
(above $22,500)--
2. Residence within the business
area--
3. Receipt of few threats--
4. Middle-aged (40-54 years old)--
5. Own this business only, and no
other--
6. Two and more owners per firm--
THE CONVERSE OF THE SENSITIZING FAC-
TORS POSSESSED BY THE NOT-PLANNING-
TO-CLOSE GROUP ARE CONDUCIVE TO
STAYING, BECAUSE.....
more to lose, harder to sell.
closer ties to the area (an unusual
thing for a business district).
fewer and lesser fears.
feel too old to start again elsewhere
and too young to retire.
wholly dependent on this source of
income.
more complex decision process
(although this item may also reflect
larger size of firm).
This section presented the factors which appear to have sensitized
the closed and the planning-to-close groups to consider closing. It has
also presented the converse of the Sensitizing factors which appear to
have lead the not-planning-to-close group to prefer staying.
In short, this section has presented the differences in factors
that lead to the first step in the different decisions made--consideration
of closing. There are yet other steps to consider, particularly the
Decisive factors. We will turn first to the Exceptional factor and the
Responsiveness characteristic, then we will discuss the Decisive factors.
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(2) Exceptional Factor
In contrast with the factors on which the closed and the planning-
to-close agree, there is one factor on which they differ significantly;
on this factor the closed group is aligned with the not-planning-to-close
group! Since some factors that produce closing also produce planning-to-
close, this factor is an exception: it is related to closing and not-
planning-to-close; but it is not related to planning-to-close.
1. One or more years of college education - more than half of the
owners of both closed firms and also not-planning-to-close firms had higher
education: 21 of the 41 owners of closed firms and firms not-planning-to-
close had some college education, as contrasted with 4 of the 20 planning-
to-close owners.
THE PLANNING-TO-CLOSE GROUP POSSESSES LESS EDUCATION THAN THE OTHER GROUPS
D E C I S IO N G R 0 U P S
EXCEPTIONAL FACTOR OPEN, NOT OPEN, BUT
PLANNING PLANNING
TO CLOSE TO CLOSE CLOSED TOTAL
1. Owner had one or more years
of college education: 12/23 4/20 9/18 25/61
* Differs significantly from expected frequency by Chi-Square Test with
probability less than .05.
The meaning of this factor is not entirely clear. It may be that
the planning-to-close group, having less training, finds it more difficult
to come to a definite decision and/or to implement the decision once it
is made. Conversely, it may mean that the two other groups, regardless of
the type of decision, use their training so as to find it easier to decide
and/or to implement a decision once it has been made.
The effect of this factor on the decisions made will be discussed
further in Section C. We will now turn to the Responsiveness characteristic.
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(3) Responsiveness Characteristic
There is one characteristic on which all the groups differ; so
it is worth presenting, even though the difference is not statistically
significant. On this characteristic, the closed group is different from
both open groups; but also, the two open groups are different from each-
other.
1. Large proportion of black employees - the closed firms had
the greatest proportion of black employees; the not-planning-to-close had
the next greater proportion; and the planning-to-close had the smallest
proportion; as follows:
ALL GROUPS DIFFER IN THE PROPORTION OF BLACK WORKERS ON THEIR PAYROLLS
D E C I S IO N
RE S PONS IVENESS
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C
1. Number of firms with half or
more black employees at the
time of the riots (this
excludes firms with no
employees):
2. Number of black employees
in all firms at the time of
the riots:
OPEN, NOT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE
13/23
63/114
G R 0 U P S
OPEN, BUT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE CLOSED TOTAL
7/18
32/78
8/1 '28/54
72/96 167/288
* Differs significantly from expected frequency by Chi-Square Test with
probability less than .005. The planning-to-close group differs
significantly from the not-planning-to-close group...with probability
less than .10.
** One firm which employs a number approximately equal to the total employed
by all of the rest was omitted.
* This relation can be represented as follows: N P C
- - -none agree
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While the number of black vs. white employees in firms in the
not-planning-to-close group differs significantly from the number in
the closed group (probability less than .005), it contrasts much more
with the planning-to-close group which has far fewer black employees than
*
whites; and it is closer to the closed group in that for both these
groups, the number of black employees exceeds the number of whites.
The meaning of the differences in proportions of black employees,
with the closed group having the greatest proportion, is puzzling at first;
but a large proportion of black employees can probably be interpreted as
an attempt at greater responsiveness to the business environment.
Given this interpretation, the closed group is the most responsive
to the business environment; and the not-planning-to-close group is
reasonably responsive. But the planning-to-close group seems deficient in
responsiveness, or whatever else this characteristic may indicate. Consider-
ing the pressures in Roxbury for improvements in opportunities, including
employment opportunities, this lack on the part of the planning-to-close
group seems not only insensitive, but unwise.
2. Yet, there was no correlation between proportion of black
employees and amount of damage - the business wisdom of hiring blacks
as a means for engendering the kind of good will that could build protec-
tion for the white employer is not confirmed by this study. There was no
correlation between having black employees and not having damage, nor between
having no black employees and having damage' The figures are presented on
the following page.
* The Chi-Square value for the contrast between closed and not-planning-
to-close was 8.842; the value for the contrast between closed and
planning-to-close was 20.66!; and significance at .005 is determined
by the excess over the value 7.88 (at one degree of freedom).
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THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN AMOUNT OF DAMAGE AND RACE OF EMPLOYEES
*
AMOUNT OF D AMAGE
FIRMS THAT FIRMS THAT
RACE OF EMPLOYEES DID SUFFER *DID NOT SUFFk ALL
HEAVY DAMAGE HEAVY DAMAGE FIRMS
1. Firms having black employees: 13 29 42
2. Firms having no black employees: 6 17 23
TOTAL 19 46 65
* Does not differ significantly from expected frequency by Chi-Square Test.
(probability less than .25)
** We define "heavy damage" as severe damage (burned out or beaten) and/or
property damage of $5,000 or more.
It is surprising to find no correlation between safety and the
hiring of black employees (nor damage and no black employees). This
finding runs counter to the "common sense" prevailing both outside and
inside the area. Several businessmen told us that they felt their black
employees had protected them. On the other hand, several others told us
that they had to protect their black employees (by driving them to and from
work); or that they had been unable to protect their black employees who
were "coerced" to leave. So the businessmen themselves may be unaware
of the general non-effect on their safety of having black employees.
The explanation of the non-correlation may lie in two factors about
heavy damage:
1. that it usually takes place when owner and employees are not at the
store (at night); and
2. that the people who inflict damage either do not know or do not care
whether blacks are employed by these firms. In fact, the examples of
"coercion", if they are true, make it appear that black employees are
frowned upon by at least some of the black community--probably as being
disloyal.
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Many of the owners of closed firms seemed disillusioned about what
happened to them. They felt that they had tried to help the comrunity
by hiring many blacks and by contributing to black fund-raising drives,
such as those of Exodus and CORE, etc. Yet they were burned out.
If indeed some were "helpers" and not "exploiters", it is difficult
to find an explanation for their fate unless perhaps the retribution meted
out by rioters be on a generalized, rather than an individualized, basis.
If we are to believe the reports that damage was on a quid quo pro basis
for exploitation and also the"apologies"that some damage was "accidental"
or was "simply looting of goods that could be seen in the windows", then
it may be that real exploitation by some white individuals is playing a
much smaller part than that played by the generalized hostility to all
whites that has smouldered for years and that is now let loose on the
closest and most familiar whites--the businessmen in the area.
The fact that many black stores have been damaged also detracts from
the quid pro quo argument. Some say that the blacks who are damaged are
exploiters too. It gives one the impression that earning profits on
investment is considered exploitation, regardless of race; and, if so,
we get out of the dimensions of racial struggles and into the dimensions
of good old fashioned class riots--in the sense of economic class: the
have-nots against the haves. If this kind of thing is true, then the
prognosis for black entrepreneurship may be very poor indeed--unless the
non-profit concept can be made to work much better than it has in the past.
Almost all of the businessmen seem to feel that they are innocent and
that a terrible injustice has been done them--and done by a few people.
Their belief that it is a very few people, not their customers and not
their employees, helps to explain their remarkable lack of resentment for
blacks in the community and their willingness to stay on in the area.
Some people do add bitterness to their feelings of injury saying: "If
it weren't that we are Jews, and we don't fight back, they (City Hall)
wouldn't let them (the blacks) do this to us." These and other emotional
speulations and fictions are signs of the fact that, where there is little
real information, it is human nature to fill the vacuum with our favorite
prejudices. Facts, such as proportions of black employees and amounts of
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damage, have little to do with our opinions and actions.
The effect of the Responsiveness characteristic on the decisions
will be discussed in Section C. after a discussion of the Decisive factors.
(4) Decisive Factors
This section presents the four Decisive factors--factors for which the
closed group differs significantly from both open groups. These factors
are, thus, the apparently decisive differences in the decision to close or
to stay open.
If indeed the Sensitizing factors form a "threshold", then the Decisive
factors depend for their effect on the presence of the Sensitizing factors.
On the other hand, the Sensitizing factors alone, without the Decisive factors,
do not lead to closure.
The Decisive factors are the following:
1. Serious damage - almost half of the closed group suffered serios
damage (beaten or burned out): 13 of the 28 closed businesses suffered
serious damage, as compared with 2 of the 51 open firms;
2. Trend of business before the riots had been "down", rather than
"steady" or "up" - almost half of the closed group said that the trend of
business before the riots had been "down": 6 of 18 closed firms said that
business had been going down, as compared to 4 of 46 open firms;
3. Most owners had a variety of outside income - almost half of the
closed group had other outside income; such as, other businesses, working
wives, or income from other investments: 8 of 18 owners of closed firms had
such outside income, as compared with 10 of 50 owners of open firms; and
4. Owner used own funds, not family's funds, to start his business -
three-quarters of the owners of closed firms had used their own funds,
rather than their family's funds, in starting their businesses: 12 of 16
owners of closed firms had used their own, not family's funds, as compared
with 17 of 38 owners of open firms.
The table on the following page presents the distributions and the
levels of statistical significance. The table on the page after that presents
the reasons why the Decisive factors are conducive to closing.
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ONLY THE CLOSED FIRMS POSSESS THE FACTORS DECISIVE FOR CLOSURE
D E C I S IO N G R 0 U P S
D E C I S I V E F A C T 0 R S OPEN, NOT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE
OPEN, BUT
PLANNING
TO CLOSE CLOSED TOTAL
1. Had severe damage--store
burned or person beaten:
2. Said that the trend of
business before the riots
had been "down", rather
than "up" or "steady":
3. Had other outside income;
such as, other business,
working wife, or other
investments:
4. Used own funds, not family's
funds, to start own business:
1/25
2/24
5/26
6/19
1/26
2/22
5/24
7/17
13/28
6/18
15/79
10/64
8/18 18/68
12/16 29/52
* Differs significantly from expected frequency by Chi-Square Test with
Yates Correction with probability less than .005.
** Differs significantly....with probability less than .05.
*** Differs significantly...by Chi-Square Test with probability
.05.
less than
**** Differs significantly...by Chi-Square Test with Yates Correction with
probability less than .025.
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THE DECISIVE FACTORS POSSESSED BY THE CLOSED GROUP ALONE ARE CONDUCIVE
TO CLOSING
D E C I S I V E F A C T O R S
1. Had severe damage--
2. Said that trend of business
before the riots was "down"--
3. Had other outside income from
other businesses, working wives,
or other investments--
4. Used own funds, not family's,
to start his business--
THE DECISIVE FACTORS POSSESSED BY THE
CLOSED GROUP ALONE ARE CONDUCIVE TO
CLOSING, BECAUSE.....
--burning: either little left to
begin over with or insurance
provides sufficient sum to mobilize
with;
--personal harm: once bitten, twice
shy...intensifies fear;
not much to give up.
independence--can better afford to
leave.
independence of spirit; perhaps
special resourcefullness; saves to
invest; willing to take risks to
invest.
The latter two factors (independence of income and independence in making
the original business investment) reflect characteristics of the owner,
rather than characteristics of the firm. The second factor (the statement
as to the trend of business) may also reflect personal characteristics of
the owner, rather than characteristics of the firm; inasmuch as, the owners
gave us verbal statements of the firms' trends, rather than hard figures.
It may be that this statement reflects more on the owners's tandards and
expectations than upon actual trends of sales. In any case, it is impossible
to compare the firms with owners' subjective judgements instead of objective
numbers.
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Of the four significant variables, only the first one (severe
damage) definitely can represent objective events occurring to the firm,
or a characteristic of the firm, rather than the owner of the firm. "Serious
damage" measures an event that occurred both to the firm and to the owner,
with economic impact on the firm and psychological impact on the owner. (This
factor is of nearly overriding importance in the decision, but it is not the
total "reason" for the decision, anymore than the other variables are total
reasons.)
Neither of the still-open groups possesses the Decisive factors.
The not-planning-to-close has neither Sensitizing nor Decisive factors, The
planning-to-close group does possess the Sensitizing factors; but, not having
the factors decisive for closing, these firms are still open. The two still-
open firms possess the converse of the Decisive factors.
BOTH THE STILL-OPEN GROUPS POSSESS
WHICH ARE
THE CONVERSE OF THE DECISIVE FACTORS,
NOT CONDUCIVE TO CLOSING
T
D
H E
E C I
C O N V E R S E O F
S I V E F A C T O R S
1. Did not have severe damage--
2. Trend of business was "steady"
or "up" before the riots--
3. Does not have outside income--
4. Used family's funds, not own,
to start his business--
THE CONVERSE OF THE DECISIVE FACTORS
WHICH ARE POSSESSED BY TIE PLANNING-
TO-CLOSE AND THE NOT-PLANNING-TO-CLOSE
GROUPS DO NOT LEAD TO CLOSING,
BECAUSE.....
firm is still operable; owner has not
experienced excessive fright; or owner
has not been able to collect suffici-
ent insurance to use to start over again
elsewhere.
owner is making an adequate or good
living.
owner is dependent on this source of
income, and has little choice.
owner is less adventuresome, less inde-
pendent, perhaps less able to make
changes.
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Just having the Sensitizing factors, although they are conducive
to closing, does not appear to be enough without the Decisive factors to
produce closure.
At least two and possibly three of the Decisive factors speak for
the independent striving nature of the closed owners' personalities. It is,
of course, not sufficient to have "reason" or desire to leave; one must
also have the ability to leave--both financial and "mental"--the ability
to change or adapt to change or to leave a deal when it turns sour and
start on something fresh, rather than trying all the harder as things get
worse. The following chart summarizes the factors possessed by the closed
group--factors that give reason to leave, and factors that show ability to
do so.
THE CLOSED GROUP POSSESSES BOTH SENSITIZING AND DECISIVE FACTORS
SENSITIZING F A C T 0 R S D E C I S I V E F A C T O R S
1. Worth of business below median 2. Trend of business was "down".
(below $22,500).
2. Residence outside of the
business area.
3. Receipt of numerous threats. 1. Had severe damage.
4. Either "young" or "old".
5. Owns other businesses. 3. Had other outside income.
6. One-owner businesses.
4. Used own funds, not family's,
to start his business.
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This section presented the Decisive factors--factors that appear to
be decisive in the action to close. The Decisive factors are factors that,
when held in addition to the Sensitizing factors, seem to cause closure.
They seem to depend for their effectiveness on the presence of the Sensi-
tising factors; yet the Sensitizing factors alone do not accomplish closure.
The section has also presented the converse of the Decisive factors, which
are held by both open groups, the planning-to-close and the not-planning-
to-close.
In short, this section has presented the second, and decisive, step
that leads to closure.
This entire section on factors (Section B.) has presented the
factors in the decisions: the Sensitizing factors, the Exceptional factor,
the Responsiveness characteristic, and the Decisive factors.
All groups shared the Non-factors which were thus considered
irrelevant to the decisions. The closed and the planning-to-close groups
shared the Sensitizing factors which were thus considered a "first step"
towards closure. The closed group alone had the Decisive factors which
were thus considered necessary for separating actual from potential closures.
In short, instead of finding that the more factors firms had, the
more likely they would be to close, we found that one set of factors seems
required to create a potential for closure (Sensitizing factors) and yet
another set seems required to produce actual closures (Decisive factors).
All of the observations were made on the basis of the decision
groups as groups, and did not single out the individual firms. The following
section, Section C., will show that the results for the groups apply equally
to the individual firms. Also, the effects of the Exceptional factor and
the Responsiveness characteristic will be shown.
C. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL FACTORS IN THEIR EFFECT ON
THE INDIVIDUAL FIRNS
All previous statements in this Chapter have referred to the firms
as decision groups, rather than individually, leaving open questions as to
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the relative strength of individual factors by themselves, and also
questions as to how closely the group results fit the individual cases.
This section addresses itself to these questions.
In order to test the relative strength of the four Decisive
factors in activating closure, the individual firms in each of the three
decision groups were listed according to their possession of one, more, or
none of the Decisive factors , as follows.
IT SEEMS TO TAKE TWO DECISIVE FACTORS TO SEPARATE ACTUAL FROM POTENTIAL
CLOSURES
D E C I S IO N G R 0 U P S
Closed Firms
Planning-to-close Firms
Not-planning-to-close Firms
TOTALS
NUMBERS OF DECISIVE FACTORS
BY THE INDIVIDUAL FIRMS
POSSESSED
0 1 2 3 4 TOTAL
* *
1 2 9 4 0 16
*
13 9 3 0 0 25
*
11 11 2 0 0 24
25 22 14 4 0 65
* marks the exceptions to the title statement--8 exceptions, out of 65 cases.
The table shows:
1. most closed firms have two Decisive factors, and most open
firms have only one or no Decisive factors: it seems to take two Decisive
factors to effect closures;
2. three factors are rarely necessary; four factors, never;
3. individual factors alone have little force in determining
closures; instead, sets of factors are significant;
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4. it is not the case that the more factors a firm has, the
more likely it will be to close; instead, two Decisive factors from the
set of Decisive factors are required, or appear to be required;
5. there were only 8 exceptions out of the 65 cases.
The eight exceptions to the trend that it takes two factors from
the Decisive set to effect closure can be accounted for, at least in part,
by the workings of the Exceptional factor and the Responsiveness character-
istic!
The exceptions are the following: for two closed businesses, one
factor alone was present; for one closed firm, there were no Decisive
factors; for three planning-to-close firms, there were two Decisive factors;
and for two not-planning-to-close firms, there were two Decisive factors,
also.
Which factors accounted for these exceptions? and which of the
extra factors explains these exceptions? The following table compares
the sets of factors for which there were these 8 exceptions, and shows
that the Exceptional factor and the Responsiveness characteristic partially
account for these exceptions. (The table is on page 60.)
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THE EIGHT EXCEPTIONS SEEM TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE POSSESSION OF TWO MORE
CHARACTERISTICS- -THE EXCEPTIONAL FACTOR AND THE RESPONSIVENESS CHARACTERISTIC
HAD TREND OF HAD
SEVERE BUSINESS OTHER
DAMAGE WAS DOWN INCOME
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
USED OWN
FUNDS,NOT
FAMILY'S
TO START
BUSINESS
x
x
x
x
x
EXCEPTION-
AL FACTOR
SOME
COLLEGE
EDUCATION
-0 --------
-x --------
-0 --------
------- n.a.-------
-n.a.-------
RESPONSIVE-
NESS CHARAC-
TERISTIC
MORE BLACK
THAN WHITE
EMPLOYEES CLOSED
*
x
x
0
0
x
x ------ 0 ------ 0 ------ 0 -------- x ------- n.a.
x ------ 0 ------ 0 ------ 0 ------- n.a.------- 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
0
0
0
0
x
x
x
x --------
x --------
0 --------
0 --------
**--------
x---------
1
0
0
0
0
*1
0
*
1
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
x
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0 ------ x ------ x ------ 0 -------- x -------- x
0 ------ x ------ 0 ------ x -------- 0 ------- (none)
DECISION GROUPS
OPEN,
BUT
PLAN-
ING
TO
CLOSE
0
0
4
0
0
0
1
3
2
4
4
0
0
3*
0
0
OPEN,
NOT
PLAN-
ING
TO
CLOSE
2
2
2
2
1
0
0
2
4
2
3
0
0
0
1,1
* marks the eight exceptions.
* no college, but some extra education after high school; one in mechanics,
the other as a dental technician.
The two cases of a single Decisive factor producing closure are
in the table above. In the case of damage-only, one firm closed and one,
a planning-to-close firm, is still open. In the case of used-own-funds-only,
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one firm closed, and 13 firms stayed open. The only other cases of
single Decisive factors are to found among the still-open firms.
The finding of the non-efficacy of individual factors refutes
two contentions prevalent at this time:
1. many whites seem to think that the firms closed mainly or
entirely because of damage; this is erroneous; and
2. many blacks seem to think that the firms closed mainly or
entirely because they had been doing poorly; this is erroneous.
Both explanations are too simplistic; instead, as shown above, sets of
factors determine decisions, not individual factors.
This section has shown that it seems to take at least two Decisive
factors to separate actual from potential closures among the closed and
the planning-to-close firms. Individual factors are not effective. The
eight exceptions to the above finding are accounted for, in part, by
the additional factors--the Exceptional factor and the Responsiveness
characteristic. The results obtained for the decision groups as groups
stand up to an examination of the individual cases. The finding about
relative ineffectiveness of individual factors refutes two current
contentions about the reasons for closure as being too simplistic.
Summary
This Chapter has attempted to answer the question: why did some
firms close and some firms remain open?
This is a very important question since the answer give us an idea
of what is going on in the business area; how white people react to racial
violence, and why; and the nature of both the firms and the owners of the
firms; and ultimately leads into the question of what, if anything, should
be done.
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A. NON-FACTORS
The following are the non-factors; that is, the variables that are
shared by all three groups and that cannot, therefore, be considered
factors in the decisions. An asterisk points out the ones that were
most surprising.
* 1. Size of business, as indicated by number of employees;
* 2. Possession or non-possession of insurance;
* 3. Use or non-use of bank loans;
* 4. Rental or ownership of business quarters;
5. Owners' opinions as to whether business would have been good
in the area if the riots had not occurred;
6. Owners' willingness or unwillingness to help black businessmen
by counselling;
7. Owners' willingness or unwillingness to ask for help for
himself;
8. Religion;
9. Whether the owners' families had had a background in business;
10. Whether owners desire their children to be in business;
11. Owners' ages at the time they made their first money; and
12. Types of businesses (generally the same, but with a few
exceptions).
B. FACTORS
The following are the factors in the decisions; that is, the
characteristics that differed significantly among the three groups.
Some of the factors are shared by both the closed and the planning-
to-close groups, and not shared by the group not-planning-to-close. We
conclude that these are the Sensitizing factors--factors conducive to
closing. Other factors are held by the closed group alone, and not shared
either by the planning-to-close nor the not-planning-to-close. We conclude
that these are the Decisive factors--factors that make the difference
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between potential and actual closures.
The possession of both the Sensitizing factors and the Decisive
factors seems to result in closure. The possession of Sensitizing factors
without Decisive factors results in staying open. In the eight cases that
seemed to be exceptions to this finding, the addition of the Exceptional
factor and the Responsiveness characteristic accounted for the difference,
Thus, the finding for the groups as groups was confirmed for the indivi-
duals in the groups.
(1) Sensitizing Factors
The Sensitizing factors (those factors possessed by both the closed
and the planning-to-close groups) are the following:
1. Worth of business, below median (below $22,500);
2. Owner's residence, outside of the business area;
3. Owner received threats;
4. Owner is either "young" (25-39 years old) or "older" (55 and up);
5. Some owners own other businesses; and
6. Firm has one owner, rather than two or more.
(2) Exceptional Factor
Education: the closed firms shared the following factor with the
not-planning-to-close firms:
1. One or more years of college education.
(3) Responsiveness Characteristic
Proportion of Black Employees: while there were differences among
all three groups with respect to this characteristic (although not
significant differences) the closed group ranked highest, then came the
not-planning-to-close, and then the planning-to-close which lacked the
factor.
1. Large proportion of black employees, exceeding the number of
white employees.
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2. There was no correlation between the hiring of black
employees and lack of damage (nor between no black
employees and damage).
(4) Decisive Factors
The Decisive factors (the additional set of factors held by
the closed group, and not held by the open groups) are the following:
1. Severe damage (store burned or person beaten);
2. Trend of business before the riots had been "down", not
"steady" nor "up";
3. Most owners had a variety of outside income (not only other
businesses, but also working wives, or other investments); and
4. Owner used own funds, not family's, to start his business.
C. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF INDIVIDUAL FACTORS IN THEIR EFFECT ON THE
INDIVIDUAL FIRMS
1. Many factors taken together affected the decision to close;
there was no one factor that induced an owner to close. Instead, we found
that there seems to be one set of factors to make the owner dissatisfied
and ready to consider closure, and yet another set that must be held in
addition to the first set in order to decide the owner actually~to close.
(Two other factors also played a part, at times.)
This is an important finding in that it refutes two erroneous
contentions currently prevalent:
(a) Many whites seem to think that the businesses closed mainly or
only because of riot damage; this is erroneous; and
(b) Many blacks seem to think that the businesses closed mainly or
only because they had been doing poorly; this is erroneous.
The data refute these contentions as too simplistic.
2. It was not a case where the more factors, the more likely a firm
would be to close. Instead, there were two sets of factors associated with
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closure, and the possession of two factors from the Decisive set made
the decisive difference between thinking about closing and actually
closing. In the eight individual cases of exceptions, the Exceptional
factor and the Responsiveness characteristic accounted for these
differences; and the finding for the groups as groups held for the
individual members of the groups as well.
3. An important finding from this research is that personal or
"psychological" characteristics are very important in the decisions; and
economic factors were less important. There were a number of characteristics
about the firm itself (as opposed to personal characteristics of the owner)
which should have affected the decision to close if economic factors were
of primary importance in these business decisions. But such variables
as insurance, bank loans, size of business, and ownership of business
quarters turned out to be irrelevant to the decisions (non-factors).
On the other hand, many personal characteristics of the owners (as
opposed the characteristics of the firm) turned out to be relevant to the
decisions (i.e., factors). Such variables as education, place of resi-
dence, age, and "independence" were important in the decisions.
Further research into the firm should place increased emphasis
on the area of personal and psychological variables. This is an area long
neglected and generally in disrepute. However, if this is the area in
which factors are to be found (which we conclude from the fact that
factors were not frequently found in the economic area), then this is the
area in which we should be looking.
It seemed likely, even before beginning this study, that the
"personal" vaiables would be very important. For this reason, I had hoped
to use a psychological measure in this study. My interviewers, however,
felt so uncomfortable in using the psychological test (showing how much
this area is in disrepute!) that it had to be omitted. This turned out to
be most unfortunate since we found that the personal characteristics area
is the one to be looking in.
Recent research by Drs. David C. McClelland and David G. Winter,
which I was privileged to read early last spring before its publication,
found that the people who changed most after taking"achievement motivation"
training were people who had scored high in "efficacy" on the psychological
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test "Who Am I?" before training.
The scoring system for "efficacy" (which was designed by Stuart
Pizer, a candidate for a Ph.D. degree in Clinical Psychology at Harvard)
purports to score the subject's style of thinking about action. His
activity goals, inner resources, the lack of vague global words,
initiative and problem solving were prior characteristics that
were associated with change after the course in the Bombay
sample.
--page 20 of Chapter 9 of the manuscript.
The "efficacy" measure was, in my opinion, a very important
breakthrough in that it appeared to be the basic measure,of some
attribute, that could predict who would change after training and who
would not change.
Given its significance in predicting changers in their research,
it seemed worthwhile to attempt to use this measure in this study of
white businessmen in order to test a hypothesis that follows from their
research: namely, that the owners who closed are highest in "efficacy'
and the planning-to-close group is lowest. Again, it was most unfortunate
that this hypothesis could not be tested; because our results leave us with
several imponderables. These include: Why,with the same amount of damage,
are some people more afraid than others? or use the "reason" of fear
as a reason for closing, when others are not closing? Is it because
expressed fear is used as a rationalization after a man decides to close
for reasons other than fear?
This research has left me with the distinct impression that these
businessmen are far from being "rational economic men". A good number of
them seem to be quite the reverse--floundering, indecisive, inactive, non-
risk-taking (when the risks are obvious) or high-risk-taking (when the
risks are less obvious as they are when inaction is involved), etc.
If they are not "economic men", as we picture businessmen to be,
then they are in some senses just as helpless as consumers, neighborhood
people, and all the other types of people that are customarily looked on
as deserving of help. If any other argument is needed, it should surfice
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to point out that this group could not possibly be considered the
stereotyped topnotch, strong, independent businessmen--or they would
not be operating tiny businesses in one of the most dangerous and
least secure sections of Boston' Surely, their profits are not high
enough to override these problems which make operating costs very high
in that area.
If it is true that they are on the helpless side, then the next
objection to providing them with help may be the idea that if they are
so uneconomic as to be helpless, then they ought to be allowed to "die
off", so to speak. This argument does not sufficiently consider the
fact that small businessmen do provide needed services, although they
do so uneconomically in many cases. They provide needed services which
are not provided by large businesses.
If the services of small stores are valuable, and I think they
are, we may have to adjust to the idea of supporting them in some way;
otherwise, we may be left without the services provided by small stores.
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) SUMMARY
A. PURPOSE
In June, 1967, and again in May, 1968, there were riots in the
shopping district known as Grove Hall, in the Roxbury section of Boston.
This area has been troubled, but neglected, for a long time. Many
stores had closed over the years; but now, with the increased damage to
stores and people, the number of closures has increased tremendously.
Every other store seemed to be boarded up--and even some open
businesses are operating behind boarded, rather than glass windows.
It seemed that now was a time of crisis for the various parties
involved in the area: the white businessmen, the local consumers, the
black leaders and organizations pressing to increase black ownership;
black businessmen operating in the area; and property owners--not to
mention the City of Boston in terms of its tax yield and its reputation.
Our purpose was to gather information about the nature of the
crisis for the purpose of assisting potential decision-makers and actors
(of both the public and the private sectors) to help the people of this
area. We need to understand the situation: what needs to be done?
What can be done?
B. METHOD
This was a descriptive research project (rather than an
experimental one): events (the riots) occurred first; and subjects (the
white businessmen) were interviewed after the event.
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Eighty-one white owners of open and closed businesses were
interviewed at length (53 open and 28 closed) out of the total population
of 112 businesses (74 open and 38 closed). The responses of this nearly
total population were tallied and analyzed by the standard statistical
techniques for contingency tables (Chi-Square Test, Chi-Square Test with
Yates Correction, and Fisher Exact Probability Test).
Thirty people were involved with the interviewing which took
place during the months of May and June, 1968; but all of the
statistical work was done by the investigator.
C. FINDINGS
There are still white businessmen in the riot area of Roxbury,
although many have left. Many stores were damaged to varying degrees,
both during the riots and at other times, before and since.
Owners' Plans. Thirty-eight owners closed; 27 are planning-to-
close, and 26 are not-planning-to-close. Almost all of the still-open
owners (48 out of 53) want to sell their businesses and leave the area.
At least half feel that they cannot possibly sell, even at a "fair"
price (cost of inventory alone); so they must plan to stay. Of the
other half, some plan to close, feeling they will be able to sell; and
others feel that they are in so much danger that they must leave anyway,
sell or not.
Reasons for Closure. The departure of so many firms this year,
since the riots, (leaving a total of 29% vacant stores) indicates that
there is a relation between the violence of the riots and the closing of
the stores. However, the violence of the riots alone does not entirely
account for the closures.
There were two sets of factors associated with closure. One set
sensitized owners to consider closure--these were the factors shared by
the closed and the planning-to-close groups. But the additional
possession of.two factors from the set of Decisive factors seemed to be
decisive in producing actual closure--these were factors possessed by
the closed group alone.
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The Sensitizing factors were: worth of business below the median
for all the businesses (below $22,500); residence outside of the general
Roxbury area; receipt of numerous threats; either youthfulness or older
age; ownership of other businesses; and the ownership of the firm by one
person, rather than several people.
The Decisive factors were: severe damage (store burned or person
beaten); downward trend of business before the riots; possession of
varied types of outside income (other businesses, other jobs, working
wives); and the use of own funds, not family's funds, to start their
own business.
Pressures towards closure are not the only factors to take into
account. Pressures away from closure were important too, and so was the
possession of a capacity to adjust to change, and a modicum of
independence of spirit and means.
A number of characteristics were shared by all the firms, and
were thus considered irrelevant to the decisions made. Surprisingly
enough, these non-factors included insurance, bank loans, size of
business as indicated by number of employees, and status as owner or
tenant.
Consumers. If the trend of vacancies continues at the present
rate, with whites leaving and blacks not buying in, then needed services
will not be available to the consumers of the area.
Transfers of Businesses from Whites to Blacks. Transfers are
not taking place, and there do not seem to be any potential buyers.
Only 6 sales have taken place.
The whites who leave or who want to leave face either the loss
of their entire assets or heavy loss sustained in relocating (plus the
high risks of starting in a new location).
There is no doubt that transfers would be to the advantage of
whites who want to leave. Transfers would also be to the advantage of
consumers (as argued above, they need services). But are the businesses
worth buying?
Depending on fair appraisal, fair pricing, adequate financing,
and professional consulting assistance to new black owners, there is no
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doubt that there is a market here to be tapped. The reasons for closure
point to poor business as only one aspect of closure. Secondly, the
people who remain in the area claim to have businesses that have been
doing fairly well. (Of course, as in anything else, claims need to be
checked; but it seems reasonable that the possession of a fairly decent
business would deter closure, provided that expectations of future
damage is low and that the owner does not feel that he has other options.)
Black Businessmen. The few black businessmen whom I had
occasion to talk with in the area, and outside of the area, seem to
have problems very similar to the white businessmen's--damage,
insurance, dependence on their business, some inability to take risks,
etc.
Secondly, the black businessmen in the immediate area do not
seem to be profiting from the decrease in white businesses: the violence
potential of the area has reduced hours of trade and numbers of
customers; also both the shabbiness and the loss of magnetism (through
loss of numbers and varieties of firms) have been deleterious.
Conclusion. In short, whatever psychological, emotional, and
practical results may have come out of the riots, nothing good, so far,
seems to have come out of the riots for the businessmen, the consumers,
nor the other parties involved in the business functions of the Grove
Hall shopping area.
There was little anger and prejudice and much understanding on
the part of the white businessmen who remain in the area, although anger
seemed more pronounced among those who had had greater damage and who
had closed.
In many ways this was all the more remarkable, because despite
whatever injustices some owners may have perpetrated, the white businessmen
are bearing the full brunt of damage done by the entire white society,
and not done by themselves alone. The white businessmen are merely the
visible and near-to-hand targets of the entire white America that has
produced so much disadvantage and hostility.
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It seems clear that the people of this area need assistance
and that it is a public responsibility to provide assistance.
(2) POLICY RECONNENDATIONS
1. WHAT WOULD FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF WHITE BUSINESS TO BLACKS?
(a) a non-profit brokerage service would facilitate the transfers
PROVIDED THAT IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THERE ARE POTENTIAL BUYERS (so that we
know it is worth the cost of setting up such a brokerage).
The Appendix contains the results of a survey conducted among the
professional brokers in the Boston area showing: 1. a few brokers have
Roxbury businesses as clients--but no buyers; 2. very few of the brokers
are willing to handle small businesses (businesses selling for under
$25,000); and 3. no brokers are located in the Roxbury-North Dorchester
area.
(b) fair appraisals are needed and should be provided;
(c) insurance is needed and should be provided;
(d) protection is needed and should be provided;
(e) financing and counselling for black businessmen are needed
and should be provided. Both are provided to some extent by a number of
agencies, but there are problems of over-long waits for processing
(especially for help from the Small Business Administration) and
problems of inadequate or haphazard access to personnel representing the
agency (especially for the Urban Foundation--people don't know who to go
to for help). The Urban Foundation (set up a few months ago) has a
"skills bank" and is preparing to make loans. The agency is not,
however, set up primarily for the transfer of businesses, but mainly for
new business development, which may or may not involve transfers.
2. WHAT POLICIES WOULD ASSIST THE SITUATION IN GROVE HALL?
(a) assistance with transfers, as outlined above;
(b) financing and counselling for existing black businessmen--
much more of it and ready access to it;
(c) assistance for white businessmen--
1. for those who stay--counselling on neighborhood
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relations; assistance in gaining protection; opening
communications with the neighborhood for mutual attitude
change;
2. for those who want to leave--a brokerage service,
financing, help finding new locations;
3. for those who have left--help finding jobs for the
unemployed who want jobs, help starting new businesses,
financial assistance to recompense losses sustained.
(d) assistance for all--City tax incentives for store
rehabilitation;assistance in obtaining 312 commercial rehabilitation
loans (3% interest); better communication of the availability and location
of opportunities to obtain help; and better City services.
3. WHAT JUSTIFIES PUBLIC INTERVENTION INTO THESE "PRIVATE" AFFAIRS?
(a) a large number of residents depend on this area for their
shopping--especially important because the area lacks good public
transportation and because car-ownership is low--without intervention
the prognosis is poor;
(b) the events in this area are the results of numerous injuries
by numerous of the public, but are being sustained by relatively few
people--especially the white businessmen, but also the black businessmen
in the area. As such, the losses sustained are not equitable, and the
businessmen deserve assistance and recompense;
(c) the need for black business ownership and the need on the
part of whites to sell their businesses are in agreement with each other
such that meeting these needs would serve all parties;
(d) these needs involve many people;
(e) the private sector is not taking care of all of these needs
and is not likely to take care of them.
(3) ACTION-RESEARCH
This research project was conducted partially in the tradition
of the City Planning profession, which seeks information for the purpose
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of developing long- and short-range plans of action. The research was
also partially in the tradition of the Business Management profession,
which seeks information to be used as the basis for decision-making for
long- and short-term actions. But the project had an additional
dimension, as well. An effort was made to weave action into the very
process of developing the information.
During the period when the research was being conducted, the
investigator was simultaneously involved in promoting actions to
ameliorate the situation of the black and white businessmen of the
Roxbury area. This was done partially through disseminating interim
reports on the research as results were achieved, which has already led
to some action; and partially through acting as a broker to channel
resources into the area.
A third and important element in this project was the collection
of sponsors and working parties from both "sides" of the situation--
black and white organizations--and also from the academic community.
This cooperative effort focussed on accomplishing one goal: to provide
information that would lead to ameliorative action.
The sponsors brought their varied viewpoints to the research--
and to each other. Because of these things, the project included
investigations of extra questions and viewpoints that would not have
been developed without the feedback on preliminary results that the
sponsors provided from their diverse perspectives. The research became
an iterative, rather than a one-shot process.
Interim preliminary reports were issued and acted upon before this
publication of the total results. Three weeks after the beginning of the
field work, towards the end of May 1968, the investigator circulated a
preliminary report on the open businesses. The report was carried by the
newspapers (Boston Globe, May 29.and June 2), and was distributed
informally among concerned people.
As a result of the preliminary report, a group in Brookline
decided to assist in the transfers and the investigator put them in touch
with a Roxbury group. Although the Brookline group has not yet achieved,
during the summer months, the full activity that it had intended, one
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person from this group, Mr. Benjamin Bartzoff, President of Snelling and
Snelling Employment Counsellors, has provided a great deal of counselling
assistance to some black businessmen in the area.
Secondly, the Brookline group came up with an extremely valuable
helping concept: to provide interest-free loans, insurance, and full
counselling to blacks who want to get into business--but only to a
limited number--so that the goals are accomplishable! They have provided
a model for any suburban group that may want to be usefully involved.
About a month after the preliminary report on the open white
businesses, the investigator and James David Preston (candidate for the
S.M. in Management degree at Sloan, MIT) surveyed professional business
brokers; and circulated a preliminary report on these findings. (The
final report is in the Appendix.) This circulation resulted in the
writing of a proposal to fund a public brokerage service, by Melissa
*
Hutchins and Edward Teitcher of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and
the City Demonstration Agency (the group previously called The Model City
Administration), which was reviewed by this investigator.
A list of the white businessmen was provided to both the Combined
Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'Nai B'Rith for
their use in contacting the white businessmen to offer assistance. (But
in conformity with our promise of confidentiality, no information about
the individual businessmen nor their affairs was revealed).
In other words, the formal research product represented by this
final report is but one aspect of the action-research process.
It was hoped, in doing this project, that the information
collected would occasion the provision of funds and counselling assistance
for transfers from whites who want to transfer to blacks who want to buy.
So far, there has been some action, as described above, but not enough.
The Urban Foundation, which incorporated a few months ago, has been
providing increasing amounts of counselling through its Skills Bank,
headed by Walter Milne of MIT. (The investigator has channeled a number
of blacks to this group.) The U.F. has also committed itself to making
* M.C.P., M.I.T.
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loans; and several have been approved so far, although as yet none have
actually been made.
Other spinoffs of this project have included the following:
Professor Severyn Bruyn of Boston College has asked for and
received the investigator's permission to adapt her questionnaire to his
research on the Dudley Terminal merchants in Roxbury, for the Joint Center
for Inner City Change (the Urban League and Boston College).
Finally, the Head of the Research Dept. at the Federal Reserve
Bank, Boston, Edwin Gooding, has asked and been granted the investigator's
permission to publish a shortened version of this report in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin. Also, Action for Boston Community Development, the
organization that originally commissioned the report through Robert M.
Coard who is now Executive Director-elect, plans to publish the entire
report.
These are both important steps since the author is not aware of
*
the existence of any other research on white businesses in riot areas
although throughout the past year we have all of us heard of the damage
and looting occurring in such areas throughout the country.
This report makes no claims to be representative of other areas,
but it does claim to be a step in the right direction.
In short, the action-research concept describes a situation in
which both the investigator and the clients are simultaneously involved
in both the research (posing questions and getting answers) and in
promoting action to ameliorate the conditions under investigation. The
action-research concept has been developed and carried out with some
degree of success in this project, and will continue beyond this "final"
report.
* There have been numerous brief newspaper articles and one long article
in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, June 2, 1968.
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A.-1
FINDINGS FROM THE
SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS BROKERS IN THE BOSTON AREA
Riva M. Poor
and James David Preston
(Candidate for S.M. in Management degree, M.I.T., 1969)
This final report is a brief summary containing: Purpose, Method,
Findings, and Conclusion. The findings are similar to those circulated in
the Preliminary Report.
(1) PURPOSE
The purpose was:
1. to check our impression that the problem of business transfers from
whites to blacks is not being handled by the normal market channel, professional
business brokers; and
2. to obtain a description of the services normally performed by brokers
for business transfer clients.
(2) METHOD
Personal interviews with business brokers listed in the 1968 Yellow
Pages were conducted by David Preston during July and early August, 1968. Of
the 16 firms listed in the directory, 11 were interviewed; 2 refused interviews,
and 3 could not be located, depite dozens of telephone calls.
(3) FINDINGS
1. No professional business brokers are located in the Roxbury-
North Dorchester area of Boston, nor near it.
Survey of Business Brokers A.-2
2. Only 3 brokers had clients from the area--all sellers, no buyers.
3. None of the brokers had handled any transfers in this area, for
years.
4. The brokers who had clients who want to sell say that they are
not able to find any buyers, and do not expect to be able to find any.
5. The other 8 brokers are not likely to be handling transfers for
this area: first, because they are not receiving requests; and, secondly,
because they feel that it is unprofitable to handle small businesses-- firms
selling for under $25,000. (Some of the brokers do not handle firms under
$100,000.)
6. The function of a business broker is to introduce buyers and
sellers to eachother. The broker does this by using a network of business
contacts that he has developed over the years. Other functions are optional.
Some brokers do appraisals; some arrange financing through banks and
through private financing channels. Many brokers specialize in the handling
of one or another type of business.
7. The brokers' fees are usually paid by sellers. Usually, the fee
is 10% of the selling price of the business, although it may vary.
8. There is no licensing nor formal registration for business brokers.
(4) CONCLUSION
People interested in promoting small business transfers in the
Roxbury-North Dorchester area will have to provide a non-market-based broker
service; because the fees payable by small businesses are not worth the time
of professional brokers. Secondly, the professional brokers do not appear
to have an active network in the area--and a network is important to their
performing their function: no contacts, no transfers. Still, a serious
question remains: although we know sellers exist (from the main study), are
there any buyers?
A.-3
ACTION for BOSTON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Inc.
18 TREMONT STREET e SUITE 200 - BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108 - Telephone 742-4210
July 9, 1968
Dear Business Broker:
This letter is to introduce Mr. David Preston, a graduate
student at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Mr. Preston is one of a group of graduate students from
both MIT and the Business Assistance Program at t1 Harvard
Graduate School of Business who has volunteered to assist
us in collecting information about the current business
problem and opportunities in the Roxbury-North Dorchester
area, for planning purposes.
We would appreciate your cooperation and assistance.
The cooperating sponsors of this project are: the Anti
Defamation League of B-nai B-rith, the Model City Neigh-
borhood Board, and Action for Boston Community Development
Incorporated. The project is directed by Mrs. Riva Poor,
an economic development planner, working under Mr. Robert
Coard, Director of the Planning and Evaluation Department
of ABCD.
Two articles are enclosed for your information.
Thank you for any assistance you are able to give to this
unique cooperative effort.
Sincerely,
George Bennett
Executive Director
GB:my
Enclosures
ARTHUR J. GARTLAND, PRESIDENT: MRS. DORIS A. GRAHAM, VICE PRESIDENT: KENNETH 1. GUSCOTT, VICE PRESIDENT;
MRS. MELNEA A. CASS, VICE PRESIDENT: ROBERT GARDINER, vICE PRESIDENT: FREDERICK A. RITCHIE, TREASURER:
F. DOUGLAS COCHRANE, CLERK: GEORGE BENNETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
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LIST OF BUSINESS BROKERS FROM THE YELLOW PAGES
None are located in or near the Roxbury area.
1. ABC Business Brokers & Realty, 31 Cross, Malden; 332-3564.
2. Abbot-Anderson, Inc. 20 Gralynn Road, Newton; 969-7330.
3. Alevizos, John P. Associates, Brookline; 232-9770.
4. Belmore Co., 18 Tremont St., Boston; 523-5471.
5. Boylston Business Associates, 739 Boylston St., Boston; 267-1860.
6. Buyers-Sellers Business Exchange, 145 Tremont St., Boston; 523-8390.
7. David B & Co., 6 Beacon St., Boston; 227-6340.
8. Doyle A. F. & Co., 59 Beacon St., Boston; 523-0681.
9. Greater Boston Registry of Business Opportunities, 82 Miller Rd.,
Newton; 969-4024.
10. Hancock Corp., 27 State St., Boston; 524-7600.
11. Industrial Development Corp., 156 State St., Boston; 742-2460.
12. O'Donnell Jodrey Realty Trust, 780 E. Broadway St., Boston; 269-4377.
13. Rosenfeld, Richard D. & Associates, 133 Boylston St., Boston; 734-2900.
14. Serata Morris, 262 Washington St., Boston; 227-1315.
15. Tofias, George I., 167 Corey Road, Brighton; 734-4700.
16. Waltham Homes, Inc., 977 Main St., Waltham.; ,894-0802.
1.
CODE:______
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
Date
1. Business Brokerage Firm
Address
Person contacted
Telephone
Position
Extension
2. What is your opinion of the business transfer situation in the ghetto
areas of Roxbury, North Dorchester, and the South End?
2.
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
. What do you feel are the business problems and business transference \
problems in these areas?
3.
CODE:Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
4. Does your firm have any policy with respect to doing business in these
areas?
4.
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
5. What experience, if any has your firm had with business transfers
in these areas?
- II I
5.
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
if yes - what resulted
if no - why
5. (A) If none Reasons why not:
1. Have you had any requests for your service from owners of businesses
in these areas or from potential buyers?
2. Have you ever rejected requests for services in these areas?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE: 6.
North Dorchester Area of Boston
3. Does your firm like to go into the Roxbury North Dorchester area?
3-
4. Does your firm feel that the Roxbury - North Dorchester businesses
are too small for your firm to handle?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
5. Does your firm feel that the problems involved in business transfers
in the Roxbury - North Dorchester area are not worth the effort?
What problems?
0
CODE: 8.Business Brokerage Study f or the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
6. Other reasons?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
5. (B) If yes
CODE:
most recent first
with whom or more important
when what type of business
nature of service
performed buy
Negro
sell
-U.
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
if yes - what resulted
if 'no - why
5. (B) Reasons why:
1. Have you had any requests for your service from owners of businesses
in these areas or from potential buyers?
2. Have you ever rejected requests for services in these areas?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury--
North Dorchester Area of Boston
11.
CODE:__
3. Does your firm like to go into the Roxbury-North Dorchester area?
4. Does your firm feel that the Roxbury-North Dorchester businesses are
too small for your firm to handle?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE: 12.
North Dorchester Area of Boston
Have you had any other requests for your services from owners of businesses
in these areas or from potential buyers?
... ...l
1 .OW.,
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE: 13.
North Dorchester Area of Boston
6. What problems do you think there would be in performing any type of
business brokerage service in the Roxbury - North Dorchester area?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
7. What do you think business brokerage firms, such as yours, can do to help
the situation in these areas?
.... to find buyers who want to sell?
...... to effect transfers?
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester area of Boston.
8. List of business brokerages ........ m
1. A B C Business Brokers & Realty
31 Cross, Maiden
2. Abbot-Anderson Inc.
20 Gralynn Road, Newton
3. Alevizos, John P. Associates
Brookline,
4. Belmor Co.
18 Tremont Street, Boston
5. Boylston Business Associates
739 Boylston Street, Boston
6. Buyers-Sellers Business Exchange
145 Tremont Street, Boston
7. David B & Co.
6 Beacon Street, Boston
8. Doyle A. F. & Co.
59 Beacon Street, Boston
9. Greater Boston Registry of Business
Opportunities
82 Miller Road, Newton
10. Hancock Corp.
27 State Street, Boston
11. Industrial Development Corp.
156 State Street, Boston
12. O'Donnell Jodrey Realty Trust
780 East Broadway Street, Boston
13. Rosenfeld , Richard D. & Associates
133 Boylston Street, Boston
14. Serata Morris
262 Washington Street, Bost n
15. Tofias, George I.
167 Corey Road, Brighton
16. Waltham Homes Inc.
977 Main Street, Waltham
15.
issed any others??
322-3564
969-7330
232-9770
523-5471
267-1860
523-8390
227-6340
523-0681
969-4024
524-7600
742-2460
269-4377
734-2900
227-1315
734-4700
894-0802
Business Brokerage Study f or the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
9. What are the functions that business brokers perform?
CODE: 16.
10 Do you perform the appraisal service yourself , allow
your client to appraise his own business , or have
an outside agency perform this service for you ?
Name of outside agency
Address of outside agency
Telephone number
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury- CODE:
North Dorchester Area of Boston
11. Do you in any way handle the problem of financing for your buyers?
Yes No
In what ways ?9 What factors influence your decision to aid ?
12 What method do you use to charge for your services?
10
17.
-- A-
CODE: 18.Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
13. Do you handle all sizes of businesses or do you have a minimum value
below which your firm will not handle?
14. What other channels, other than brokerages such as yours, are used by
people tp buy and sell businesses?
4'
Business Brokerage Study for the Roxbury-
North Dorchester Area of Boston
15. How does your firm " drum-up " business?
CODE: 19.
16. Who are your
a) clients:
b) paid by:
clients and who do
buyers
buyers
you get paid
sellers
sellers
17. Is there a national association of brokers ? Do you have to be
licensed ? Registered ? What is the nature of the above ?
00
by?
both
both
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COMPARATIVE LIST OF OPEN AND CLOSED FIRMS
Showing Types of Firms
COMPARATIVE LIST OF OPEN AND CLOSED FIRMS B.-l
NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE TYPES OF BUSINESSES THAT CLOSED AND THE
TYPES THAT STAYED OPEN ARE APPARENT IN COMPARING THE LISTS OF THESE BUSINESSES
OPEN CLOSED ALL
TYPES OF BUSINESSES FIRMS FIRMS FIRMS
1. Manufacture 2 1 3
2. Wholesale 2 0 2
3. Retail 37 24 60
Food 9 7 16
Furniture (new & used) 6 1 7
Pharmacy 2 4 6
Eating Place 4 1 5
Liquor 4 1 5
Hardware 4 1 5
Apparel 2 2 4
Variety 1 2 3
Gas Station 3 0 3
Building Supply 2 1 3
Miscellany 0 4 4
4. Service 9 9 18
*
5. Professional 3 3 6
6. Unidentified 0 1 1
TOTAL 53 38 91
* Includes: laundry, barber, tailor, cleanser.
** Includes: optometrist, insurance agent, lawyer.
The open firms are not subdivided into planning-to-close and in order
to protect the confidences of the owners in this small set. However,
the sets are so small as to make the showing of the comparisons relatively
worthless--there were no obvious differences among the open business groups.
**** Page 36-37 of the text have a discussion of the differences.
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FORMULAE FOR STATISTICAL TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE
C.-'
FORMULAE FOR STATISTICAL TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE
(1) STATISTICAL PROOF
The process of proving that an hypothesis is true is the process
of proving that the variables in the hpothesis are not unrelated to each-
other. If they are not unrelated, then they must be related; and your
hypothesis is supported.
The basic task that the statistical tests perform is to tell you
whether to allow any significance to the fact that your numbers came out
looking quite different from eachother--that is, to tell you whether the
numbers could have developed that way by chance even though the variables
are unrelated.
The "expected frequency" is what the numbers would have been if
the variables are unrelated to eachother. If a test shows that the numbers
"differ significantly from expected frequency", then the variables are
related and your hypothesis is supported.
Still, there is the element of chance that must be taken into
consideration. It is possible to have heads turn up 4 times in a row
when a coin is perfectly fair or even on both sides; but at what point
would we want to figure that a coin was not fair--10 heads in a row? In
other words, what confidence can we place in our results?
The degree of confidence that one can place in the statement of
relationship between variables is given by the "probability". For example,
"with probability less than .05" means that in only 5 or fewer cases out
of 100 would there have appeared this configuration of numbers, had the
variables been unrelated. In other words, there is a very good chance
(95 or better out of 100) that the variables are related. The smaller
the sample size, the harder it is to prove that the differences in the
configurations are significant; that is, the differences must be more
pronounced to prove this. The larger the sample, the less pronounced
the differences must be to be significant.
Formulae for Statistical Tests
The smaller the level of probability, the better for supporting
the hypothesis that the variables are related. The higher the level,
the worse. The .05 level of confidence is an acceptable, if not
conservative, one for social science research.
The preceding paragraphs have explained the importance and the
meaning of the phrase: "differs significantly from expected frequency by
the Test with probability less than .Ox."
(2) GENERAL FORMAT FOR CONTINGENCY TABLES
Independent Variable
IY Y
Dependent Variable
Xn n12 R1
n21 n2 2 R2
C C2 N
This example is a 2 x 2 table; but tables
can be r x c, r x c x k, and so forth.
= variables ( A and A = A and not-A )
= Row total (RI = the total of Row one)
= Column total
= R + R2 + CI + C = grand total
= general form identifying the number in the cell of row i,
column j
A, B
R.
C.
N
n .
c.-2
Formulae for Statistical Tests C.-3
(3) FORMULAE FOR TESTS USED IN THIS PROJECT
A. GENERAL FORMULA FOR CHI-SQUARE TEST -- used where N is greater than or
equal to 20, and where n. . is greater than or equal to 5
13J
( flu
R . C 2
N
Chi-Square
R. C.
1 J
N
B. SIMPLIFIED FORMULA FOR 2 x 2 TABLES ONLY
N (
Chi-Square
n 1 n22 n22 )
R R2 C1 C2
If Chi-Square is greater than the value found in the Chi-Square
table for the appropriate degree of freedom (formula is in C. ), then
reject the Null Hypothesis; that is, reject the idea that the variables are
independent, and accept the idea that the variables are related, at the level
of confidence selected by you (under which you looked up the value of Chi-
Square that your value of Chi-Square had to exceed).
C. FORMULA FOR OBTAINING DEGREES OF FREEDOM
v
= degree of freedom
= number of rows
= number of columns
example: for a 2 x 2 table
v = 2 - 1 (2 - 1)
v =(1)(1)= 1
v
i
j
Formulae for Statistical Tests
D. FORMULA FOR YEATES CORRECTION -- used when N is less than 20 or when
n. . is less than 5 -- FOR 2 x 2 TABLES ONLY
13
Chi-Square
N (|n n22 - n12 n 2 1 1 -
R1 R2 C1 C2
E. FORMULA FOR CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR n x n TABLE
Chi-Square
( Nn.. - R C
N i j R. C.
1 J
F. THE FISHER EXACT PROBABILITY TEST -- FOR 2 x 2 TABLE ONLY
The operation (p ) is performed on the contingency table. Then one
cell is reduced by subtracting the number one, and the operation is again
performed on this new contingency table (N remains N throughout). The entire
process is repeated until the operation has been performed for a table in
which one cell has become zero. Then all p. are added, giving P, the exact
probability of the original table.
P = pi ,
R1 ' R2! C1 ! C2
P N. n.11 n1 2 . n2 1 n2 2 '
n! = factorial n = n x (n - 1) x (n- 2 ) x... x I
for example, 5! = 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1= 120
.5 N )2
C. -4
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SURVEY OF WHITE BUSINESSES AFTER THE RIOTS
1.
2.
3.
Letters to Businessmen
Questionnaire for Closed Businesses
Questionnaire for Open Businesses
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ACTION for-80STON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Inc.
18 TREMONT STREET - SUITE 200 - BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108 Telephone 742.5600
April 30, 1968
Dear Businessman:
This letter is to introduce Mrs. Riva Poor and associates
who are collecting information about the current business
problems and opportunities in the Roxbury-North Dorchester
area for planning purposes, in cooperation with the follow-
ing agencies: The Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai Brith,
The Model City Neighborhood Board, and Action for Boston
Community Development, Inc.
We would appreciate your cooperation and assistance.
Mrs. Poor is an economic development planner working under
the direction of Robert Coard, Director of the Planning and
Evaluation Department of ABCD. This effort is made possible
in large part by the able assistance of volunteers from the
Business Assistance Program of the Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration and volunteers from various graduate
schools at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, includ-
ing the Sloan School of Management.
Thank you for any assistance you are able to give to this
unique cooperative effort.
Since,rely,
-91
org Bennett
Executive Director
ARTHUR J. GARTLAND. PRESIDENT: MRS MELNEA A. CASS. vicE PEsaIDENT: ROBERT GARDINER. VICE PwESIDET:
KENNETH 1. GUSCOTT, VICE PRESIDENT: REV, WILBUR C. ZIEGLER, VICE PRESIDENT: FREDERICK A. RITCHIE. TREAsuman,
F. DOUGLAS COCHRANE. CLARK: GEORGE BENNETT. EXECUTIVE DaInCTro
NEW ENGLAND
REGIONAL BOARD
Chairman
A. RAYMOND TYE
Committee Vice-Chairmen
WARREN B. KOHN
Community Service
SIMON SCHEFF
Civil Rights
ARNOLD M. SOLOWAY
Program
Area Vice-Chairmen
BERTRAM L. BERNHARDT
Rhode Island
MORRIS BOORKY
Central Massachusetts
GEORGE M. LEVENSON
Southern Massachusetts
LOUIS LISMAN
Vermont
JULIUS POPKIN
Western Massachusetts
ARTHUR E. PORTER
New Hampshire
DR. BENJAMIN ZOLOV
Maine
Treasurer
ROBERT C. SCHAYE
Associate Treasurer
SIDNEY W. GROSSMAN
Honorary Chairman
HON. DAVID A. ROSE
New England Regional Director
SOL KOLACK
National Chairman
DORE SCHARY
National Director
BENJAMIN R. EPSTEIN
New England Members
of National Commission
MORTON R. GODINE
ALAN R. MORSE
SIDNEY L. RABINOWITZ
DAVID A. ROSE
A. RAYMOND TYE
D.-2
NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL OFFICE
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
72 FRANKLIN STREET, SUITE 504
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02110
Telephone LI berty 2-4977
April 30, 1968
Mrs. Riva Poor
ABCD
18 Tremont Street
Boston, Massacthusetts
Dear Mrs. Poor:
Thanks very much for your excellent coopera-
tion with regard to the problems of merchants
in the Roxbury area. I think that the research
you are carrying on is extremely important, and
I hope you will receive the best possible co-
operation from the merchants in the Roxbury area.
Sincerely yours,
Sol Kolack
Executive Director
SK/bp
CLOSED FIRMS
SURVEY OF WHITE BUSINESSMEN WHO LEFT THE AREA
(TO BE FILLED OUT BY INTERVIEWER , AFTER THE INTERVIEW)
CODE:
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERVIEWER Interviewer's telephone number
Date of Interview -
(Month) (day)
1968;
(Day of the week; e.g., Monday,
Tuesday, etc.)
Location of Interview
(Full Address)
Is this the businessman's home, new place of business, or "other"?_
Address of Former Business
Name of Former Business
Type of Business
Businessman's Plans and Actions:
When did he leave?
How did he leave? (a) he was burned out
(b) he transferred ownership .
(c) he liquidated
(d) he relocated his business ; Where to?
(e) he started a different kind of business ___; Wha
(f) he's operating a business he owned before closure
(g) he retired
(h) he is working for someone else
t kind?
; Where?
Doing what?
(i) he has plans to do something else __; What?
(j) he is undecided
Businessman's Ethnic and Religious background:
Jewish; __Irish; _Italian; __Other (please specify)
Businessman requested a copy of this study: Yes; No
PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW THE INTERVIEW WENT: WAS HE COOPERATIVE? FRIENDLY?
COMMUNICATIVE? ETC.
How much time did the interview take?
Businessman's Name
When did you start?
; Home address
Home Telephone number ; Business Telephone number
CODE: 2.
WBWLA
Q--L. Are you the former owner of (the business-)
which was located at ?
If "No" - - -
Who was the owner?
FIND OUT HOW YOU CAN REACH THE OWNER: AND SEE IF YOU
CAN ARRANGE TO MEET HIM.
DO NOT PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE INTERVIEW IF YOU
CANNOT TALK WITH THE OWNER.
Q--2. Were you the sole owner?
1. Yes
0. No
(INTERVIEWER, THE OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION ARE ON THE- LAST PAGE.
IF THE OWNER VOLUNTEERS THE INFORMATION AT THIS
POINT, THEN FILL IT IN. OTHERWISE - DO NOT PROBE
WAIT UNTIL YOU GET TO THAT PART OF THE INTERVIEW.)
Q--4. Would you please explain to me: Why did you leave?
Q--5. When did you leave?
(date)
CLOSED FIRMS
3.
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Q--6. Had your business ever been looted, robbed, burned, or vandalized;
or had you ever been personally threatened or personally harmed?
0. No; 1. Yes
(IF "YES," INTERVIEWER FILLS OUT THE FOLLOWING COMPLETELY.
READ EACH POSSIBILITY SEPARATELY; AND FILL IN THE ANSWERS
TO THE' QUESTIONS ON THE RIGHT, BEFORE GOING ON TO THE NEXT
POSSIBILITY.)
Amount
Dollar recovered Was
(Q--7)
0. Windows broken
1. Other vandalism
2. Attempted burglary
(means attempted
break & entry -
people not
present)
When &
how many What happened?
amount by he
of loss? insurance insured?
times?
3._Burglary
4. _Attempted robbery
(means attempted
with people
present)
5. Robbery
6. Looted
7. Burned
8. Threatened
IF SO, BY WHOM? and WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE THREAT?
9. _Personally harmed
CLOSED FIRMS CODE:
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Q--8 What factors did you weigh in the decision to leave? That is, What
were the items in favor of staying and what were the items in favor
of leaving?
ITEMS IN FAVOR OF STAYING ITEMS IN FAVOR OF LEAVING
Q--9 How long had you been operating your business at that location?
years
Q--10 Had you been planning to leave for a while before you left?
0. _ No; 1. Yes
Q-ll For how long had you been thinking about leaving?
Q-12 Why were you considering leaving?
Q-13 Would you have thought to leave even if there had been no unrest in
the area and you did not feel threatened? Why?
Q--14 If the problems you have mentioned had not existed, would you say
that the business opportunity for your type of business had been
good in that area?
CODE: 4-CLOSED FIRMS
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Q--15 Did you make any. attempts to find a buyer? (for the business)
0. No; 1. Yes.
Q--16 If yes, how did you go about trying to find
a buyer?
Q--17 What sorts of problems or obstacles did you
encounter in trying to get a buyer?
Q--18 Did you sell your business? (or are you in
the business?)
0._ No; 1. Yes
Q--19 If yes, Do you feel that
reasonable payment?
0. No;
the process of selling
you got a just or
1. Yes
Q--20 To whom did you sell?
Q--21 Is the buyer Negro?
0. No; 1. Yes
Q--22 Are you staying on or did you stay on in the
business for a while in order to teach the new
owner--or have you some other arrangement of
this kind?
0. No; 1. _ salaried basis;
2. partnership; 3. _ some kind of counselling
(please specify)
Q--23 Do you think that he will make a success of it
(or that he is making a success of it? Why?
0. No; 1. Yes
- CLOSED FIRMS
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Q--24 What kind of financial arrangement did you make?
(INTERVIEWER, READ T.HE ALTERNATIVES TO HIM)
0. cash only; 1. long-term payments (mortgage)
2. _other (please specify)
Q-25 Is some financial institution assisting the buyer?
0. No.
1. the S.B.A.; How long has he been negotiating with them?
2. bank; Which one?
3. other; please specify
Q-26 What was the price for which you sold the business, and what was
included?
ITEM PRICE
Inventory
Furnishings & Fixtures
"Good Will"
Machinery or other equipment
Other; please specify
CLOSED FIRMS WBWLA
7.
CODE:
We are concerned to know how the closing of your business has affected your
life, whether it has created serious problems for you, and how you are doing
now. To begin with:
Q--27 What are you doing now?
0. retired
1. working for someone Who?
Where?
Doing What?
2. in business
Where? ; When started?
What type?
Was it operating before closure?
3. other; please specify
on vacation
planning, but undecided
looking around
starting something
Q--28 At the time of closure, did you own any other businesses?
0. No; 1. Yes
Q--29 If so, What kind(s) of business(es)?
Where? How long?
Q--29 At the time of closure, did you have any other sources of income?
For instance,
(INTERVIEWER, READ THE ALTERNATIVES):
0. No; 1. Yes
Wife works
Real estate
other (please specify)
CLOSED FIRMS CODE:
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Q--30 Did you come out of the closure with any money or other assets?
0. No; 1. Yes
Q--31 Was this enough to start over again or to live on?
Q--32 What anount did you come out with? $
Q-33 Has the closure created problems for you? If so, please explain.
0. No; 1. Yes
Q--34 Do you have any (other) plans for the future?
0. _ No; 1. Yes
Q--35 Please explain.
Q--36 Is there any sort of assistance that you need now and would like
to have?
0. No; 1. Yes
assistance to relocate?
assistance to sell something?
Q--37 How do you feel about the closure?
Q--38 Would you want to go back? or is there any circumstance under
which you would want to go back?
1. Yes Circumstance
8.
0. No;
CLOSED FIRMS
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Q--39 Had your business been growing?
Would you put this into percent figures (percent increase or decrease
in gross sales per year)?
RISE NEUTRAL OR STEADY DECLINE
PERCENT CHANGE
Q--40 Were you making a good income from the business?
Q--41 What was your annual income from the business?
Q--42 Did you own the building or did you lease it?
owned 
.
rented
What was the value of the building? $
What was the amount owing on the mortgage? $
What was your commitment on the lease?
(months or years?)
-or-
Were you a tenant-at-will?
What was your monthly rent? $
Did you have to pay a penalty when you left?__
If so, what?
Q--43 How often did your stock turn over (or what was your turnover)?
times per
Q--44 What do you consider to have been a fair price for your business?
What was the value of your inventory? $
What was the value of your furnishings & fixtures? $
What was the value of your "good will"? $
What was the value of your machinery, or other equipment? $
Other items? Please specify
CODE:
9.
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Q--45 Had you ever taken out any bank loans for your business (OTHER THAN
A MORTGAGE FOR THE BUILDING) and do you have any bank loans for the
business outstanding now?
0. No
This was because----
(a) could not get a bank loan
What banks had he tried?
Had he tried the S.B.A. (Small Business Administration)?
(b) does not believe in borrowing money
did
(c did not need to borrow money
1. Yes
This was because----
(a) did not need it, just borrowed to get good credit
(b) did need it; used the money for_
What bank? (S)_
S.B.A.?
How much were you able to borrow? $
What were the terms?
Q--46 Did you have any insurance? (INTERVIEWER, THIS REFERS ONLY TO HIS
BUSINESS, NOT TO LIFE INSURANCE NOR
HOME INSURANCE.)
0. No.
Q--47 Had you tried to get insurance?
0. No 1. Yes
Were you unable to get it? (please describe)
1. Yes
Q--48 What types?
1. Fire; 2. Liability; 3. Burglary; 4. Riot
5. Contents
CLOSED FIRMS
WBWLA
Q--49 Was it possible to get additional insurance?
11.
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0. No; 1. Yes; 2. Don't know.
Q--50 Did the insurance premiums go up?
0. No; 1. Yes; 2. Don't know.
Q--27 If so, by how much?
0. don't know; 1. times
Q--51 Had you had insurance cancelled?
0. No; 1. Yes.
Q--52 If so, when?
Q--53 What credit arrangements did you have with suppliers?
Q--54 Did you give credit to your customers?
Q--55 How many employees did you have? BESIDES YOUTSELF
(Q--56)
TOTAL NEGRO WHITE
FULL TIME
PART. TIME
Relatives Non-relatives
WBWLA
Q--57 What are your employees doing now that the business is closed?
Q--58 What do you think might have been done differently to prevent some
of the violence that has occurred in the area?
Q-59 Would you please comment on the quality of police protection in
the area, when you were there? (Please give concrete examples.)
Q--60 What do you think is the future of the area; especially, with
regard to its business potential?
Which, if any, of the following statements apply to the area?----
Q--61 You'd have to be a Negro businessman in order to make a
living there.
Q--62 Even a Negro businessman can't make a living there.
Q--63 Would you be willing to help some Negro businessman get started in
business in some way? If so, how?
0. No; 1. Yes 2. Yes, but not in a competing
business (not in a business
that competes with mine).
3. by giving counselling & advice; 4. Other
(please specify).
CODE: 12.CLOSED FIRMS
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Q--64 We would like to understand what it takes to be a businessman -
what kind of person is able to make a go of being in business.
Would you tell us what it takes to run your kind of business...
what kind of person you have to be?
Q--65 How many years have you been a business owner?
(Not necessarily this business here, but owning An business.)
Q--66 What is your age? years.
Q--67 Has anyone in your family ever owned a business?
(INTERVIEWER, FIND OUT WHO --- ESPECIALLY, WAS HIS FATHER IN BUSINESS?
WHAT TYPES OF BUSINESSES? ETC.)
WHO TYPE OF BUSINESS
Q--68 Why did you decide to go into business? (that is, originally)
Q--69 What other options did you have? and how did you feel about them
in comparison?
Q--70 What were the major obstacles that you had to deal with when you
first started out?
14.
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Q-71 What kinds of help did you have in the beginning?
(INTERVIEWER, THIS MEANS WHAT KIND OF ASSISTANCE DID HE HAVE;
e.g., did his family help him in some way?)
Q--72 How did you get the capital necessary for starting your business?
Q--73 What amount was this? (THAT IS, HOW MUCH DID HE START OUT WITH?)
$ _ of his own
$ -borrowed from
Q--74 What year was this? (WHEN HE WENT INTO BUSINESS FOR THE FIRST TIME)
19 ; -years ago.
Q--75 How did you manage to get your business started?
Q--76 What kinds of training and experience have you had that has helped
you in your business? Which of these items apply to you?
(READ THEM ALOUD)
Formal training
Worked for relative
Worked for someone else in similar business
other (please specify)
Q--77 How old were you when you first made some money?
Q--78 What did you do to make this money?
Age
CLOSED FIRMS
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Q--79 What aspects of business are most satisfying to you?
15.
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(READ ALTERNATIVES ALOUD)
being own boss
making money
dealing with people
satisfying customers
other (please specify)
Q--80 Which is the most important thing to you? (CHECK ONE OF THE ABOVE LIST).
Q--81 Would you like your children to be businessmen?
(INTERVIEWER, THIS IS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WHICH APPLIES EQUALLY TO
THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE CHILDREN, WHOSE CHILDREN ARE ALREADY IN OTHER
FIELDS, ETC. PLEASE GET AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.)
0. No; 1. Yes.
Q--82 Why?
Q--83 What is your marital status?
Q--84 How many children do you have?
Q--85 Ages of children? MALE ; FEMALE
(Q--86 Sex of respondent )
Q--87 What is your religious and/or ethnic background?
- Jewish ; Italian
(The Anti-Defamation
League is inquiring.)
Irish;
Other (please specify
CLOSED FIRMS CODE:
WBWLA
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
Q-88 Which of the following forms of business organization apply to the
closed business that we have been talking about?
Partnership;_
Corporation
How many partners were there?
Were any relatives? If so, how many?
How many stockholders were there?_
(INCLUDING HIMSELF)
If any stockholders were relatives,
how many were relatives?__
(INTERVIEWER, FILL THIS OUT YOURSELF: )
Q--91 'Was the business entirely family owned; i.e., entirely
owned by relatives?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH
16.
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SURVEY OF WHITE BUSINESSMEN OPERATING ON THE AVENUE
(TO BE FILLED OUT BY INTERVIEWER, AFTER THE INTERVIEW) CONFIDENTIAL
Interviewer
Date __j968; _ __
(month) (day) (day of the week, e.g., Monday, Tues, etc.)
Typeof business Name of business
Address of business
Location: midblock; corner
Appearance of business quarters:
Inside
Outside,
Businessman's Plans:
1. plans to stay
(a) would never sell
(b) might, under some circumstances, sell
2. wants to leave
(a) hopes to sell
(b) is negotiating a sale __
(c) has already sold
(d) plans to move to other quarters
(e) plans to liquidate (f) will retire
3. is undecided
4. has aletady left
(a) transferred ownership (b) liquidated
(c) moved to new location
(d) plans to move to new location ; (f) will retire
Businessman's Ethnic and Religious background:
Jewish; __ Irish; * Italian; other (please specify)
OPEN FIRMS CODE:
CONFIDENTIAL CODE NUMBER:
Are you the owner?
Yes
If "No"
Who is the owner?
FIND OUT HOW YOU CAN REACH HIM: AND SEE IF YOU CAN ARRANGE TO
SEE HIM LATER.
IF YOU CANNOT ARRANGE TO SEE HIM, WRITE DOWN INFORMATION THAT
WILL HELP SOMEONE ELSE TO CONTACT HIM.
DO NOT PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE INTERVIEW IF YOU CANNOT TALK
WITH THE OWNER.
Q-ll Are you the sole owner?
1. Yes_
0. No
(INTERVIEWER, THE OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
BUSINESS ARE ON THE LAST PAGE - page 18. IF THE OWNER VOLUNTEERS
THE INFORMATION AT THIS POINT, THEN FILL IT IN. OTHERWISE, DONOT
PROBE; WAIT UNTIL YOU GET TO THAT PART OF THE INTERVIEW.)
Q--4 What do you feel are theproblems facing you as a businessman here
in this location (in the light of the recent events -- riots,
United Front demands, etc.)?
2.
OPEN FIRMS CODE:
Q--5 Has your store ever been looted, robbed, burned, or vandalized?
0. No.
( If 'Yes" FILL OUT THE FOLLOWING, BY DATES: )
DATE TYPE OF DAMAGE COMMENTS
DOLLAR AMOUNT AMOUNT RECOVERED
OF LOSS BY INSURANCE
0. none
1. _ looted
2. burned
3. vandalized
4. personally harmed
0. none
2.,
2.,.
.looted
burned
3. _ vandalized
4. personally harmed
(Q--7)
at other times
(FILL IN DATE) (PLEASE SHOW THE NUMBER OF TIMES EACH HAS OCCURRED)
0. nothing has ever happened
1. burglarized (break, entry; people not present)
2. robbed (people present)
3. vandalized
4. personally harmed
(Q--8) Have you ever been threatened in any way; and, if so, by whom?
(Please describe.)
0. no
1. yes
3.
CHECK IF
HE WAS
NOT
INSURED
(Q--5)
June
1967
riot
(Q- -6)
April
1968
riot
OPEN FIRMS CODE:
Q--9 Do you feel that your business is in danger of being looted, robbed,
burned, or vandalized, or that you might be personally harmed or
threatened?
0. ______none (no fears nor expectations)
1. looting
2. burning
3. vandalism
4.
5. robbery
6. _"All or most" of the above
7.
8.burglary
personally harmed
-all, including personal harm
Q--10 What are you considering doing or have you already decided to do
in response to these problems?
1. (RECORD WHATEVER ANSWER HE MAKES; BUT IF HE DOES NOT MENTION ONE
OF THE ALTERNATIVES, THEN READ THE ALTERNATIVES TO HIM: leave,
stay, undecided.
0. CHECK HERE IF YOU HAD TO READ THE ALTERNATIVES TO HIM.)
0. Leavig or wants to leave [(GO TO PAGE 6, QUESTION 24.)J
STAYING OR UNDECIDED
Q--12 How definite are these plans?
0. indefinite
Q--14 What would make
you come to a
definite decision?
1. __ definite
Q--13 What would make you
change your mind?
4.
(Q--ll) 1.---
5.
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Q--15 What factors are you weighing in this decision?
That is, what are the pros and cons? (PROBE)
ITEMS IN FAVOR OF STAYING ITEMS IN FAVOR OF LEAVING
Q--16 Would you like to leave if you could receive a just or
reasonable payment for your business? (That is, would you
be willing to sell your business?)
1. Yes (GO TO QUESTION 20)
0. No; __undecided
Q--17 If loans were made available to make up the
difference between what you could get tor your
business here and what it would take to set up
a new business elsewhere, would you be
interested in selling your business?
1. Yes (GO TO QUESTION 20)
Q-105
What would you do and where
would you go if you left
this business, here?
0. No.
Q--18 Are there any circumstances
or are there any special
arrangements that would induce
you to sell your business?
0 No GO TO QUESTION 42
1. Yes
Q--19 Please explain.
Q-20 Would you have planned to leave even if there
was no unrest in the area and you did not
feel threatened? Why?
1. Yes; 0. No
6.
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Q--21 If you sell your business to a Negro, would you be
willing to help him in some way to learn how to run
your business?
1. Yes .0. No.
Q--22 For instance, would you be willing to stay on in the
business for a while, perhaps on a salary basis, in
order to teach him? Or is there some other arrangement
you would be willing to be involved in? Please
describe.
(READ THE ALTERNATIVES)
0 No
1. Salaried basis
2. partnership
3. some kind of counselling
4. seminars or some
kind of teaching
5. _spend several days
explaining the
business to a Harvard
Business School
consultant
Q--23 Would you be willing to accept payments over a period
of time in exchange for receiving a higher price for
the business? Please explain your answer.
1. Yes; 0. No
[ GO TO PAGE 11 QUESTION 42..
LEAVING OR
WANTS TO LEAVE
Q--24 What factors are you weighing in this decision?
That is, What are the pros and cons? (PROBE)
ITEMS IN FAVOR OF STAYING ITEMS IN FAVOR OF LEAVING
7.
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Q--25 Would you have planned to leave even if there was no unrest in the
area and you did not feel threatened? _hy?
1. Yes; 0. No
Q--26 How definite are your plans? For instance, do you already have a
buyer or have some other arrangements worked out?
0. __not definite yet [GO TO PAGE 9 QUESTION 36_
1. definite.
Q--27 What are these arrangements?
1. has already sold the business
2. is negotiating to sell the business
3. __is selling out the stock
4. _other (please specify)
not selling, but
6. definitely shutting down by ____ (date)
If 6, go to P. 10, Q--43
Q--28 Do you feel you are getting just or reasonable
payment?
Q--29 To whom did you sell (or are you selling)?
Q--30 Is buyer Negro?
1. Yes; 0.__No.
8.
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Q--31 Are you going to stay on in the business for a while in order to
teach the new owner--or have you some arrangement of this kind?
0. No
1. salaried basis
2. partnership
3. some kind of counselling (please specify)
Q--32 What kind of financial arrangements did you make?
( RFAD THE ALTERNATIVES )
1. long-term payments (mortgage)
2. cash only
3. some combination
Q--33 Is some financial institution assisting
the buyer?
0. no
1. _S.B.A. (How long has he been negotiating
with them?
2. bank (which?
3. _other (please specify)
Q--34 How did you go about finding a buyer?
Q--35 What sorts of problems or obstacles to
selling did you have to meet?
OPEN FIRMS
[TGO TO PAGE 10 QUESTION 43 _]
Q--36 Have you made attempts to find a buyer?
0. No (GO TO QUESTION 39)
1. Yes
Q--37 How have you gone about trying to find
a buyer?
Q--38 What sorts of problems or obstacles have
you encountered (in trying to get a buyer)?
Q--39 If you sell your business to a Negro, would you be willing to help
him in some way to learn how to run your business?
1.__ __Yes; 0. No
Q--40 For instance, would you be willing to stay on in the business for
a while, perhaps on a salary basis, in order to teach him? Or is
there some other arrangement you would be willing to be involved in?
Please describe. ( READ THE ALTERNATIVES )
0. No
1. salaried basis
2. partnership
3. some kind of counselling (please specify)
9.
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Q--41 Would you be willing to accept payments over a period of time in
exchange for receiving a higher price for the business? Please
explain your answer.
1. Yes; 0. No
Q--43 What will you do if (or when) you sell your business here?
0. retire
1. undecided
2. open business in a new location.
Q-44 Where?
Q--45 Are these plans definite? Do you know
when you will open?
0. not definite
1. definite (specify)
3. work for
Q--46
somebody else.
Where might that be? and doing what?
Q--47 Are these plans definite?
0. not definite
1. definite (specify)
Q--44 How do you feel (or how will you feel) about this new course
of -action?
11.
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Q--42 If you do not sell your business, would you be willing to help some
Negro businessman get started in business, in some way? How?
0. No
1. Yes
Q--46 What changes in your business or your business practices, if any, have
you made since the riots? Please include items such as protection,
inventory, prices, hours, etc.
CHANGES & PURPOSE DATE COST EFFECT ON BUSINESS
Protection - gun, revolver,
stick, metal grills, etc.
Pricing
.Chagnjed._hos~r
Inventory
Q--47 If these problems you have mentioned (in question 4) did not exist,
do.you see the business opportunity for your type of business in
this area as good? Please explain.
0. No
1. _Yes
2. Undecided
Q--48 Had your business been growing before the riots?
Would you put this into percent figures (percent increase or
decrease in gross sales)
RISE NEUTRAL DECLINE
PERCENT
Q--49 Do you own the building or do you lease it?
owns What is the amount of the mortgage at present?
$ (total owing)
(months or years)
Q--50 leases What is your commitment on the lease? (CIRCLE ONE OF
THE ABOVE)
12.
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Q--51 How often does your stock turnover (or what is your turnover)?
times per
Q--52 What would you consider a fair price for your business?
ITEM FAIR PRICE
Inventory
furnishings & fixtures
good will
other (specify)
Q-53 Have you ever taken out any bank loans for your business (other
than mortgage for the building) or do you have any bank loans for
the business outstanding now?
O no -- was this because -
(a) could not get a bank loan (What banks did he try?)(S.B.A.?)
(b) does not believe in borrowing money
1._ yes - was this because you -
(a) did not need it - just borrowed to get good credit
(b) _ did need it; used money for ______?
What bank? (s) S.B.A.?
Q--54 Do you own any other businesses?
0. no
1. yes
Q--55 What kind of business(es)? Where? How long? etc.
13.
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Q--56 Have you any other sources of income? (For instance ... )
No
1.yyes
wife works
real estate
other (specify)
Q-58 Do you have any insurance?
0 No
1. _yes
Q--59 What types?
1. Fire_;_
4. Riot_____;
PLEASE GET NAMES OF COMPANIES
on Insurance questions
2. Liability_ ; 3. Burglary_
5. All types excepting riot
6. All types including riot
Q-60 Is it possible to get additional insurance?
0. No 1._ yes 2. don't know
Q-61 Did the insurance premiums go up?
O no
1. yes
Q--62 If so, by how much?
0 don't know 1. times
Q-63 Have you tried to get insurance?
0 no 1. yes
Q--64 Were you unable to get it? (please describe)
CODE:OPEN FIRMS
Q--65 Have you had insurance cancelled?
0 no
1. yes
Q--66 When?
Q--67 What credit arrangements do you have with suppliers?
MAJOR SUPPLIERS CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS
Q--84 Does he give credit to his customers?
Q--68 (Who are his major suppliers?)
0 no answer
1. _he answered
Q--69 Could a new business owner get the same arrangements?
1.yyes
0 No or unlikely
Q--70 Why not?
Q--71 How many employees do you have?
Q--72
TOTAL NEGRO
BESIDES HIMSELF!
Q--73
WHITE
Relatives Non-Relatives
FULL TIME
PART TIME
14.
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Q--76 Do you belong to any business associations or neighborhood associations?
0 no
1yyes
Q--77 Which ones do you belong to?
Q--78 Does it (or do they) have any policy with regards
to your problems?
0 no
1. yes
Q--79 What is-this policy?
Q--80 Is the organization active?
1.___yes
Q--120 We would like to understand what it takes to be a businessman ---
what kind of person is able to make a go of being in business.
Would you tell us what it takes to run your kind of business?
and/or what kind of person you have to be?
Q--81 How many years have you been a business owner?
Q--82 What is your age?
Q--83 Has anyone in your family ever owned a business? (INTERVIEWER: FIND
OUT WHO; ESPECIALLY, Was his father in business?)
15.
16.
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Q--85 Why did you decide to go into business?
Q--87 What other options did you have? and how did you feel about them
in comparison?
Q--90 What were the major obstacles that you had to deal with when you first
started out?
Q--91 What kinds of help did you have in the beginning? (INTERVIEWER: THIS
MEANS WHAT KIND OF ASSISTANCE DID HE HAVE; e.g., did his
family help him?)
Q--122 How did you get the capital necessary for starting your business?
Q--123 What amount was this? (THAT IS, HOW MUCH DID HE START OUT WITH?)
Q--124 How did you manage to get your busine3s started?
Q--92 What kinds of training and experience have you had that has helped
you in your business?
Q--89 How old were you when you first started to make money? Age
And what did you do to make money?
Q--93 What aspects of business are
most satisfying to you?
Q--95 Would you like your children
to be businessmen?
17.
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Q--97 Is there any sort of help (assistance) that you need now and would
like to have?
0. No.
1. Yes
Q--99 Would you give us the names of businessmen in this area who have
closed down or sold out so that we can talk to them too?
(INTERVIEWER, PLEASE GET ENOUGH INFORMATION SO THAT WE CAN FIND
THESE PEOPLE.)
BUSINESSMAN'S NAME HOME ADDRESS STORE NAME OLD LOCATION TYPE OF BUSINESS
Q--100 What is -your name?
Q--101 What is your home address?
Q--102 Telephones: Business Home
Q--103 What is your religious and/or ethnic background? (The Anti-Defamation
League is inquiring.)
Jewish
Irish
-Italian
other (please specify
Q--98 Please explain.
OPEN FIRMS
Q--115 Marital status?
Q--116 Number of children?
Q--117 Ages of children? Male_ Female
(Q--119 Sex of Respondent ___)
/0 GANIZATION OF TIHE BUSINESS/
IF HE IS NOT THE SOLE OWNER--
Q--l. continued. (If there is a partnership) how many partners are there?
Are any of the partners relatives? If so, how many?
Q--2 Is the business incorporated?
0. No
If "Yes"--
How many stockholders are there? INCLUDING HIMSELF)
If any of the stockholders are relatives, how many
are relatives?
(Q--3 (INTERVIEWER, FILL THIS OUT YOURSELF) Is the business entirely
family-owned; i.e., owned
entirely by relatives?
1. _yes 0. No
.THANK YOU VERY MUCH
18.
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